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Executive Summary
Root Causes
The challenges and obstacles to effective land management, which are also the main sources of conflicts, 
are manifold and diverse. The roots can be found in the civil war and its aftermaths, when Somaliland 
towns and cities were destroyed, the state and its land management system disintegrated, ownership 
documentation were lost, and the returning population appropriated public as well as private land. Although 
most cities have nowadays been rebuilt, many people still live in poverty and lack access to basic social 
services and urban infrastructure. Moreover, rampant land grabbing prevails, since the diaspora driven real 
estate market has led to an increase in the value of urban land while landownership remains unclear. 
Hence, the major challenges for urban land administration in Somaliland are to improve land planning; to 
provide social services and urban infrastructure, especially for the urban poor; to reclaim public land; to 
clarify landownership and to regulate the real estate market.
Land Management
Land management is the prerogative of the state, since customary as well as shari’a law and respective 
institutions are not adaptable to the complex requirements of modern private landownership in the urban 
setting. Urban land administration in Somaliland has been slowly re-established since the mid 1990s, a 
process that is still ongoing. Thereby, the most important institution is the local administrations, which 
is headed by an elected Mayor and Deputy Mayor and an Executive Secretary appointed by the central 
government. 
It includes a Land Department with several sub-units in charge of allocating plots and registering and 
issuing land ownership certificates and building permits. The elected Local Council, the legislative institution 
at the municipality level, is in charge of overseeing the administration and contributing to the planning and 
management of public affairs, including land. National institutions, in particular the Ministry of Public Works 
and the National Urban Planning Board (NUPB), are responsible to plan the use of land, to draw town 
master plans and to oversee the performance of local land administration. 
However, national as well as local institutions and structures are so far often unable to manage land 
effectively and address the country’s most urgent problems relating to land, a fact that can partially be 
attributed to the nature of the evolving state and its administrative system. Thus, the first land law, which 
was adopted by parliament in 2001 and amended in 2008, addresses many of the above-mentioned 
problems and challenges, such as the registration and legalization of landownership, the resettlement of 
returnees and urban planning. Nevertheless, the law remains unclear at many points and contains several 
gaps and shortcomings, leading to overlapping institutional responsibilities and duties. 
Hence, competition between various state authorities complicates land management and planning in 
Somaliland towns and cities. Instead of cooperating and developing joint land management strategies, 
state institutions often rival among each other and with the public over control of- and access to land. As a 
result, long-term and strategic urban land planning seems to be absent and there is no town master plan 
to regulate and organizes the use and allocation of land. 
The role of the Local Council in land management is controversial. In Burao, its involvement in the 
landownership registration process has led to a dispute with the Mayor, who argues that the Councillors 
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have taken over executive duties. Also in Hargeisa, the influence of Local Councillors in land management 
is sometimes rather negative, as they interfere in administrative procedures and often squabble among 
each other. 
Improvements have already been achieved in the verification, legalization and registration of landownership, 
a complicated process that involves crosschecking by several institutions and officials in order to ensure 
that the ownership claim of the applicant is legal and uncontested. The data obtained and the documents 
created during that process are used as a basic information system to better manage land and to clarify 
landownership. However, the registration of landownership is made difficult by the contested nature of 
landownership. 
Also the weakness of the state and corrupt officials hamper effective urban land management in Somaliland. 
On the one hand, the authorities often participate in land grabbing and make their own business by selling 
land to businesspersons and investors or issuing dual ownership documents. On the other hand, state 
institutions often lack the capacities to enforce the law and prevent land grabbing. Fearing public unrest, 
they tend to abstain from dismantling illegal structures. 
Even if supported by NGOs, which provide housing and other facilities, the administration is thus often 
unable to evict returnees and urban migrants from public land. Moreover, the provision of resources has 
raised expectations among the illegal occupants that they will receive substantial benefits in return for 
leaving public plots. 
In order to improve land management, the legal and institutional framework has to be overhauled. Existing 
gaps, shortcomings and ambiguities in the law have to be clarified and institutional duties and relations 
need to be regulated. The central government should strengthen cooperation between all institutional 
stakeholders and put pressure on the agencies involved in the NUPB to fulfil their duties and to draw town 
master plans. The local governments, including the Local Councillors, have to participate in this process in 
order to guarantee democratic decision-making. Moreover, their land management capacities have to be 
increased and effective anti-corruption systems and measures have to be implemented. 
Generally, all policies and decisions relating to land should be taken in a participative manner and in 
cooperation with elders and community representatives. The Local Councillors can play a key role and act 
as links between communities and the state, seeking to draw support among their constituencies for land 
management policies and presenting people’s needs and concerns to relevant decision makers. 
Land Conflicts and Conflict Management
Because of the weakness of the state and the dominance of clan structures in Somaliland society, land 
disputes between individuals can escalate into clan conflicts and, against the background of the wide 
spread circulation of small arms, turn violent. Thereby, land-based conflicts and weak land management 
are interrelated problems. Administrative shortcomings, for instance corruption and the dual allocation of 
real estates, often lead to conflicts, which in turn are an obstacle to effective land management. In Burao, 
where clan tensions prevail, land management is thus more complicated than in Hargeisa, where relations 
between the clans are more peaceful. Moreover, state institutions in the capital of Somaliland enjoy more 
autonomy from the clans and are thus able to manage land without being drawn into clan struggles. 
In urban Somaliland, three different legal institutions and respective laws are involved in conflict management: 
shari’a courts applying Islamic law, state courts applying official law and traditional councils of elders ruling 
according to customary or informal law. Clan elders are the most important institution, as state courts are 
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perceived as corrupt and inefficient while shari’a courts are predominantly called upon to solve conflicts 
related to family matters or inheritance issues. Most complicated cases, however, are addressed by ‘hybrid’ 
or ‘combined’ conflict resolution institutions, which include state officials as well as clan elders. The resolution 
process is rather traditional, based on meditation and reconciliation between the disputing parties, but 
modern ownership documents, laws and land institutions are equally important to reach a decision. 
The state, in particular Local Councillors, can play a key role in conflict resolution. State officials can facilitate 
mediation, create an arena where the conflicting parties are reconciled and, based on the agreements of 
the clans, implement the decision reached by elders. Such institutions could be formalised and regulated, 
as already attempted in Article 28 of Law No. 17, and become a standing committee. Thus, the Land 
Subcommittee and the Peace and Conciliation Subcommittee of the Local Council could be strengthened 
by a secretariat to make them more efficient and capable of addressing conflicts in the community. 
Land Tenure Security and Women Accessing Land
Land tenure is closely tied to clans and Somali cultures and traditions. Since the state is weak, mistrusted 
and based on the clan system, it is the lineage and not the constitution that guarantees landownership rights 
in Somaliland. Hence, being traditionally discriminated in Somali society, and neither being represented in 
the courts nor in the law enforcing institutions, landownership of marginalized groups and minorities such 
as the Gabooye is rather insecure. 
Also women face a series of challenges when it comes to land tenure in Somaliland. Cultural, economic 
and institutional barriers are serious obstacles for women who attempt to purchase or inherit land. The 
reality of plural legal systems causes a lot of confusion for women, who often do not have the knowledge 
of the procedural steps to be taken and/or the financial means to fight for their rights, which are enshrined 
within the constitution. Additionally, the weakness of government institutions disadvantages women to a 
great deal. 
The government and local communities thus have to take urgent action in order to improve land tenure 
security, particularly for women and Gabooye. The government has to adapt strong laws and policies that 
protect their rights, and state institutions have to be supervised to guarantee effective implementation. 
Elders need to eliminate traditional rules and cultural prejudices, which discriminate women and Gabooye 
in land tenure. NGOs should raise awareness among state officials and communities about the magnitude 
of the problem and thus support a change of thinking in Somaliland society. 
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I. Introduction
1. The Land-based Conflict Project
In collaboration with the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF) at the University of Duisburg-Essen, 
Germany, the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) conducted an eight months research project 
on land-based conflicts in Somaliland between May and December 2009. It was the third phase of a 
project that had started in 2007 and was funded by the German Institute of Foreign Relations (IFA). It 
aimed to strengthen local dialogue NGOs, i.e. the Academy in Somaliland, to enhance conflict resolution 
mechanisms in the course of integrated capacity building, dialogue, and action research processes, 
promoting awareness, analysis and good practices relating to land conflicts. In 2007 and 2008, the project 
also took place in Afghanistan in cooperation with the Tribal Liaison Office (TLO).
 
In 2009, the APD project team consisted of Mohamed Abdi (Team Leader), Nassir Osman and Safia Tani 
(Research Assistants), and Jan Stockbrügger from INEF. Rita Glavitza, from the University of Vienna (Austria) 
supported the gender component of the project. 
2. Focusing on Urban Land Conflicts and Conflict Management
Disputes over landownership and access to land are the most important sources of conflict in contemporary 
Somaliland. Against the background of fragile statehood, they are a serious threat to peace and stability in 
the country. 
In 2007, the project had focused on rural land conflicts, especially on the problems arising from the 
proliferation of enclosures and the privatisation of communal land in the pastoral context in Western 
Somaliland. In the second phase, which took place in 2008, the main focus of the research had shifted 
towards conflicts relating to water sources in Eastern Somaliland; additionally, the project team started 
working on urban land conflicts. The results, published in a report in 2009, suggest that conflicts over land 
in cities and towns are a very serious issue and a major concern for many Somaliland citizens. In 2009, the 
project team therefore decided to concentrate exclusively on urban areas.
 
Based on suggestions from the working group, however, the project opted for a broader approach than 
in the previous two years and focused more generally on land management issues. This reflects the fact 
that Somaliland has experienced more than a decade of peace and stability and that many land conflicts 
have already been resolved. Therefore, the research team not only aimed at revealing the root causes, 
dynamics and management of land-based conflicts, but to investigate current land administration systems 
and practices, examining its strengths and weaknesses. Effective land administration, the team assumes, 
will contribute to peace and development and further stabilize the country. 
The research team also focused on two interrelated and cross-cutting land management issues which 
came-up in the course of the project: land tenure security and women’s access to land. By studying land 
tenure security, the project sought to understand how people secure landownership in the absence of a 
strong state, and to shed light particularly on the situation of groups facing land tenure insecurity due to 
their marginalized role and status in Somaliland society. 
Part II of this research report, ‘Land Conflicts and Management in Urban Somaliland’, provides an 
overview of the challenges, strengths and weaknesses of current land management in urban Somaliland. 
It also provides information on dynamics of land-based conflict and on conflict resolution institutions and 
mechanisms. 
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In Part III, the ‘Land Tenure Security’ in Somaliland is analysed. This includes sections on Ethiopian 
immigrants, refugees from Southern Somalia and the Gabooye communities. 
Part VI, ‘Women Accessing Land’, is an in-depth study of women’s relations to land in Somaliland society. 
It describes the changing socio-economic role of women in the urban context, their position under different 
legal system regarding landownership and their role in land conflicts. 
3. Research Methodology and Process
3.1 Research Methodology
Research methodology was an important aspect of the project over the past three years. The project 
applied Participatory Action Research (PAR) methods, which combine applied research and dialogue in a 
highly integrative and participatory way. This enables the researchers to grasp the knowledge, views and 
opinions of different actors, which are encouraged to actively participate in the project process and to 
identify research priorities according to their own needs. Moreover, by creating local dialogue, communities 
are empowered to reach common ground and develop joint solutions for their problems.
 
The overall objective of the use of PAR methodology in the project is thus to contribute to the peace building 
process in Somaliland by strengthening the civil conflict resolution abilities of local actors.
Supported by INEF consultants, the project continuously sought to improve its PAR capacities. In 2007, 
the basic concepts and ideas of Participatory Action Research methodology were introduced and the team 
learnt how to design and apply specific research and dialogue techniques (e.g. Participatory Mapping, 
Semi Structured Interviews and Focused Group Discussion). In the following year, these tools were revised 
in order to adapt them to the urban context, and a workshop on research ethics was held. Moreover, the 
team started to apply Participatory Video (PV) as an a innovative research tool. Thereby, local communities 
in cooperation with the researchers produced a film that represents and visualizes their needs, problems, 
and shows how they solve land-based conflicts. The experiences with the PAR methodology and tools, 
including its strengths and weaknesses, are described in detail in the project report published in 20091. 
? Participatory Action Research 
? Enabling Communities to participate in the research process 
? To put people in a position where they can articulate and define their problems 
and needs 
 
? Initiating local dialogue 
? To bring together different stakeholders and actors in a joint group 
 
? Creating local solutions 
? To encourage people to analyse their problems and seek solutions 
 
? Empowering Local Communities 
? To enable people to implement decisions and solutions 
1 Academy for Peace and Development/Tribal Liaison Office/ Institute For Development and Peace 2009
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In the third phase of the project, the research team drew upon its PAR capacities acquired during the 
previous two years and further developed the gender component of the project, whereby a female consultant 
supported the team’s female researcher in a study on women’s access to land and their role in land-based 
conflicts. 
3.2 Research Process
As in previous years, the APD team ran a full cycle of desk research, consultations, field research, dialogue 
and dissemination on land conflicts. The first part of the project was designed to get a general overview of 
land-based conflicts in urban Somaliland and to identify the most urgent issues and problems related to the 
topic. Accordingly, the team conducted an extensive literature review and conducted several interviews with 
representatives from different state institutions and civil society organisations. A working group, comprising 
officials of state agencies and NGOs, provided further information and guidance to the team. 
One member of the team accompanied an APD mission that travelled throughout the country in order to 
generate an overview of the general level of peace and development in Somaliland. Thereby, the research 
carried out for the land-based conflict project resulted in a paper identifying and summarising Somaliland’s 
most urgent land administration problems and challenges on a national scale. Moreover, with the support 
of Rita Glavitza, the team’s female researcher started working on women and gender issues in relation to 
land conflicts, the findings of which resulted in a paper on Women’s Access to land.
Subsequently, in the second phase of the project, the team conducted extensive field research in Burao 
and Hargeisa to gather more in-depth information and knowledge on the dynamics related to the core 
problems, challenges and objectives identified in the first phase. The selection of Burao and Hargeisa as 
field research sites had two reasons. 
First, they are the biggest cities in the country and its major commercial centres. Second, they have a 
different social setting and conflict history. While Hargeisa is inhabited by people from all Somaliland clans 
and has largely been peaceful since the end of the civil war, Burao is dominated by only two clans and has 
experienced fierce fighting until the mid 1990s. Hence, clan tensions in the Eastern city are much higher 
than in Hargeisa, where a rather harmonious multi-clan setting has emerged. 
In both cities, the team held Focus Group Discussions with specific social groups, such as women, Local 
Councillors, elders and returnees, as well as Semi-Structured Interviews with state officials and civil society 
representatives. Furthermore, it organized consultation workshops with mixed groups in order to present 
and consolidate research results and to encourage discussions on solutions to land management problems 
and land-based conflicts. In Burao, it also applied Participatory Video to document a land dispute within a 
local community. 
In this context, the team also investigated land tenure security of marginalized social groups in Somaliland. 
The findings of this phase were compiled in a study on “Land Management and Land Conflicts in Urban 
Somaliland” and in a working Paper on “Land Tenure Security in Somaliland”. In the third phase, the results 
and findings were disseminated and discussed during consultation workshops in Burao and Hargeisa. The 
participants provided important feedback and suggestions that were subsequently incorporated into the 
final research report. 
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II. Urban Land Management and Land Conflicts in  
 Somaliland
1.  Introduction
Since its declaration of independence in 1991, Somaliland has achieved a remarkable degree of peace 
and stability. This allowed the country and its population to recover from the civil war, to rebuild basic but 
functioning state structures and to promote its economy. However, many people continue to live in poverty, 
local disputes over natural resources persist and state institutions are weak and often unable to maintain 
order. Additionally, the current political crisis relating to the postponed presidential elections has raised 
serious concerns that a fighting may break out again. Hence, peace remains fragile. 
Against this background, ineffective land management and land based conflicts are a growing problem in 
urban Somaliland. The country’s cities grow and expand rapidly, as the urban economy is booming and 
urbanisation increases. Thus, unclear landownership and the rising real estate market lead to rampant land 
grabbing and overlapping ownership claims. Moreover, many conflicts over urban property resulting from 
the civil war remain unresolved and returnees still occupy large patches of public land. 
The nascent state institutions are overwhelmed by these problems. Evolving land administration systems 
and agencies are hampered by corruption, low enforcement capacities, inefficiency, and clan pressure. The 
implementation of land policies is thus at best sporadic. Consequently, disputes relating to land are behind 
most violent incidents in towns and cities. 
Nevertheless, despite the magnitude of the problem, information on urban land conflicts and management 
in Somaliland are very scarce. Most reports published by local and international NGOs and agencies deal 
more generally with land issues and resource conflicts in rural and urban areas. Focusing exclusively on 
urban areas, Bruyas wrote an extensive report for UN-Habitat about the ‘Land legal framework’ in Puntland 
and Somaliland. In cooperation with Barry, he also produced an article on ‘Formation of land management 
administration in post-conflict Somaliland”2. Furthermore, UN-Habitat commissioned some unpublished 
consultancy reports aimed at improving land management in urban Somaliland3. 
The land based conflict project aims at contributing to a better understanding of land-based conflicts in 
urban Somaliland. Based on the assumption that effective land management will reduce conflicts and 
improve the conditions for economic and social development, the researchers focus on the relations 
between land administration and land conflicts. 
In this report, the team analyses the root causes of current urban land management problems and 
challenges (section 4) and reveals the strengths and weaknesses of the existing land administration systems 
and practices (section 5). Moreover, the dynamics and issues of urban land-based conflicts and conflict 
resolution practices will be investigated (section 6). It starts, however, with a short historical background of 
Burao and Hargeisa (section 2) and a brief description of the legal framework in respect to land management 
(section 3). 
2 See Academy for Peace and Development 2006b; NRC/UN-Habitat/UNHCR 2008; Bruyas 2006; and 
Barry and Bruyas 2009
3  e.g. McAuslan 2003
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2.  Historical Background
2.1 Hargeisa
2.1.1 Colonialism and Independence (until 1969)
Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, is located in the country’s Northwest (latitude 9A * 18 ‘N Longitude 
44A * 03’E), in an enclosed valley of the Galgodon (Ogo) highlands, an elevation of 1,334 metres (4,377 ft.) 
above sea level. The city has a mild climate with temperature ranging between 13 and 32 °C (55 and 89 
°F). 
In the beginning, Hargeisa was a watering place for livestock, consisting of hand-dug wells in the dry 
riverbed (Marodi-jeeh). The first settlement in the area was a Koran learning centre at Jama’a Weyn on the 
Southern bank of the dry valley. Later on, due to a conflict between two Sa’ad Musa sub clans, traders 
relocated their activities from Bullahar at the coast to the emerging settlement. From then on, the village 
served as a small market outpost where pastoralists traded their livestock products for grain and rice. 
In 1941, the British colonial authorities shifted the central administration from the port of Berbera to Hargeisa; 
roads were built connecting Hargeisa with the coast and the hinterland and the urban infrastructure was 
established. Meanwhile, trade in the protectorate was expanding and the village grew into a bigger and 
more important market centre for imported commodities destined for Eastern Ethiopia and Somali livestock 
exported to Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Apart from commercial premises and some administrative buildings 
at the centre of the town, however, most residential houses at that time were still thatch-roofed huts or 
nomadic tents. But as more people moved to the expanding town, schools, medical services and water 
systems were established and new shops, restaurants, and other service oriented businesses sprung up. 
Hargeisa thus became the Protectorate’s administrative capital and an important regional trading centre.
The main quarters of the town were in the Sha’ab4 precinct to the North of the river, where the colonial 
officials dwelled and the administrative offices and most businesses were located. South of the riverbed 
were the airport and the main army and police garrisons. 
From the very beginning, clan patterns of settlement were an important aspect of Hargeisa’s social 
geography. Garhagis (Habar Yonis and Eidagalle) and Arab sub-clans predominantly inhabited the South of 
the valley, while the Habar Awal sub-clans and Gabooye minority communities lived predominantly to the 
North of the valley. In the following years, however, as Hargeisa grew and dwellers from all over the country 
moved to the town, the clan landscape became more diversified.
After independence and unification with the Italian ruled South, Hargeisa was reduced to the status of a 
provincial capital and Mogadishu became the country’s new national capital where the government and 
the central administration were based. As many traders and business people also shifted their commercial 
activities to the South, the former centre of the British Protectorate declined. 
2.1.2 Military Dictatorship (1969-1991)
Nevertheless, due to the rising livestock trade to Saudi Arabia, which was based almost exclusively in the 
North of the country, Hargeisa remained a bustling regional market town. Since the beginning of the 1960s, 
livestock had even replaced bananas as Somalia’s most important export product and thus fuelled the 
Northern economy. In the 1970’s, the economy of Hargeisa was given fresh impetus by money sent from 
4 Sha’ab is the Somali term given to government or public land.
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the growing diaspora communities in the Gulf States and the city continued to grow and expanded to all 
sides. Furthermore, as the capital of Marodix-jeex region5, which at that time also encompassed Awdal 
region as well as Sahil region, including the Port of Berbera, Hargeisa remained the most important city in 
the former Protectorate. This did not change in the 1980s, when Awdal was carved out from the region. 
In the aftermath of the Ogaden war (1977-1978), the influx of refugees (mainly from the Ogaden clan) and 
foreign aid to support them turned Hargeisa into an even bigger commercial town. Consequently, the 
proportion of non-Isaaq dwellers lured by the economic opportunities increased and the city continued 
to expand. But the presence of so many foreigners and the economic marginalization of the host Isaaq 
community later fuelled opposition against the regime of Siad Barre. Military opposition started in 1981, 
when the Somali National Movement (SNM) was founded. The regime then turned against the civilian 
population for its perceived support of the opposition6. 
Hargeisa was almost completely destroyed during the civil war. Most of its residents sought refugee in 
neighbouring Ethiopia, while the city was turned into an army garrison occupied by the regime’s military 
forces. As Hargeisa remained a conflict zone, many refugees migrated to Western Europe and Northern 
America, where they enlarged the Somaliland diaspora communities. 
2.2 Burao
2.2.1 Colonialism and Independence (until 1969)
Burao is the regional capital of Togdheer region, named after the river Togdheer that bisects the town7. 
The river is usually dry but is often flooded during the rainy season. The climate of Burao is warm and dry 
throughout the year. The average daytime temperatures in the summer months from June to August is 
around 35 °C (95 °F), while during the rest of the year the average is 27 °C (80 °F). The city’s limited rainfall 
comes in September and May.
The origins of Burao are similar to those of Hargeisa. Due to the availability of water along the dry valley, 
Burao became a small inland market centre that connected the port of Berbera with the hinterland and 
provided trading facilities for the nomadic population in the region. After the murder of a colonial army 
commander in 1910, the British razed the place to the ground and destroyed its emerging village structures. 
However, Burao was quickly revived when the Colonial administration established a garrison headquarter in 
the area to fight the Derwish rebellion in the Eastern part of the Protectorate (1910 - 1920).
 
The village became a district capital and a number of public buildings were established in the following 
years. After Hargeisa was made the Protectorate’s capital in 1941, the administrative importance of Burao 
declined and its urban infrastructure remained underdeveloped. Nevertheless, with the expansion of 
livestock trade in the 1950s, the city began to grow again. Serving as the most important regional market 
centre, where livestock from the Eastern and South-western hinterlands was assembled and traded for 
export to Saudi Arabia, Burao grew considerably and replaced Berbera as the second largest city of the 
British Protectorate. 
This trend continued after independence. With the opening of a branch of the Somali Commercial Bank, 
livestock traders got access to credits and further expanded their activities. They invested their profits in 
5 The region is also called Woqooyi Galbeed
6  For a more detailed background see Bradbury 2008. 
7  In Somali ‘tog’ means riverbed and ‘dheere’ means long. ‘Togdheer’ thus means ‘long riverbed’. 
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the real estate market, building residential stone houses and thus contributed to the development and 
expansion of the city. Moreover, as the regional capital of Togdheer region, the newly created North-eastern 
region that encompassed what is nowadays Togdheer, Sool and Sanaag, Burao again became an important 
administrative centre. 
Due to its status as a regional capital, the clan composition of Burao was quite divers. Nevertheless, the 
rival clans of the Habar Yonis and the Habar Jeclo always dominated its economy and politics. The Ise 
Musa, a sub-clan of the Habar Awal, was seen as third in the clan hierarchy of the city, followed by the Harti 
sub-clans (Dulbahante and Warsangeli). This clan diversity has a long history in Burao and as early as in 
1910, elders from four different clans had funded a public building8. In general, the city is characterized by 
an East-West partition, with the Habar Yonis together with the Ise Musa settling in its Western part while the 
Habar Jeclo along with the Gabooye living in its Eastern part. The Harti, in particular the Dulbahante, settle 
on both sides of the city. 
2.2.2 Dictatorship
Under military dictatorship Burao was reorganized and restructured massively. Governor Bile Rafleh relocated 
most shanty villages within the town to its outskirts and later assigned the free space in the centre for public 
purposes, such as sports amenities or village orientation centres9. During the 1970s, many people from the 
region migrated to the Gulf States, where the oil boom had opened up new job opportunities. Their savings 
were often invested in real estates, thus stimulating a vibrant local land market. Thereby, a construction 
competition emerged between Burao’s two dominant clans, the Habar Yonis and Habar Jeclo, with both 
clans seeking to expand their clan territories within the town and to control its commercial activities. 
During that time, the military government granted the Eastern districts of Sool and Sanaag the status 
of a region. As a result, the Dulbahante and Warsangeli sub-clans of the Darood were detached from 
Burao, since they were preoccupied with the development of their own regional capitals (Las Anod and 
Erigavo). This, in turn, fuelled the competition between the Habar Yonis and the Habar Jeclo, which was 
only overshadowed by their common opposition against the military regime. The Isaaq sub-clans felt more 
and more marginalized, as outsiders from the Darood dominated the political establishment of Burao. For 
example, most governors in that time came from the South and belonged to Darood clans. Violent incidents 
against the Isaaq civilian population increased in the 1980s, resulting in the destruction of Burao in 1988. 
In parallel to developments in Hargeisa, its Isaaq citizen fled to refugee camps in Eastern Ethiopia, from 
where they supported the rebellion of the SNM. As the war continued, many of them migrated to foreign 
countries. 
2.3 Developments since 1991
2.3.1 Background: Peace- and State-building in Somaliland 
On a clan conference in Burao in May 1991, after the fall of the Barre regime, the former British Protectorate 
reinstated its independence and established the Republic of Somaliland. The SNM was mandated to 
run the two-year transitional administration under the leadership of its Chairman Abdirahman Ahmed Ali 
‘Tuur’, a former high-ranking civil servant from the Habar Yonis. During this period, the SNM splintered 
and disintegrated into clan and political factions, leading to conflicts in Burao and Berbera. It took another 
clan conference in Boroma in 1993 to restore peace and provide the ground for the rebuilding of state 
institutions. 
8 The Welfare House known locally as “kheyriyadda”.
9 These Soviet-Style Village Orientation Centres, created under military rule, were in fact used for propaganda 
purposes and to control the population. 
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Nevertheless, the Habar Yonis resented the election of Egal, a politician from the Habar Awal clan and the 
last Prime Minister before military rule, as President and thus they turned into opposition against the newly 
installed administration. In 1994, fighting started again in Hargeisa and quickly spread to Burao. Since the 
conclusion of the conflict in 1997, Somaliland has remained peaceful.
Moreover, with a constitutional referendum in 2001, followed by local elections in 2002, presidential elections 
in 2003 and parliamentary elections in 2005, the country launched an unprecedented democratisation 
process in the Horn of Africa10. However, peace, stability and democracy are currently in jeopardy. The 
presidential elections, originally scheduled for April 2008, have been delayed several times and tensions 
are rising again. Furthermore, also local elections, which were supposed to take place in December 2007, 
have yet to come11. As described in the next sections, the two inner-Somaliland conflicts in the 1990s 
have had different impacts and implications in Hargeisa and Burao concerning peace-, state building and 
reconstruction. 
2.3.2 Hargeisa
Since the end of the civil war, Hargeisa has largely remained peaceful. Only in 1994, when the government 
took over the airport from an Eidagalle (part of the Garhagis) militia, had conflict flared up again. However, it 
did not escalate into a full-scale clan conflict, as some sub-clans of the Garhagis remained neutral or even 
supported the government. Consequently, clan relations in Hargeisa remained less strained than in Burao, 
where fighting between the Habar Yonis and the Habar Jeclo continued until 199712.
Accordingly, state-building in Hargeisa started soon after the Boroma conference in 1993. The new 
government under President Egal achieved to disarm and reintegrate militias into the national armed forces, 
reopened the Port of Berbera and established functioning government structures at the national and local 
level. In 1994, it also introduced a new national currency. The local government has shown remarkable 
continuity and the Mayor only changed in 2002, after the countries first district elections. 
Peace and stability have resulted in steady economic growth, based on livestock trade13 and remittances from 
the large Somaliland diaspora. The city has largely been rebuilt and water, electricity and telecommunication 
infrastructures as well as social services such as education and medical care were (re-)established. However, 
due to the weakness of the state most of these development initiatives were organised and financed by 
private individuals, communities and the growing Somaliland business class14. Moreover, as the capital of 
Somaliland, Hargeisa became again a regional administrative and political centre. Today, the city is host of 
numerous international and national NGOs that have also contributed to its recovery. 
The emerging economic opportunities have led to a considerable influx of people to Hargeisa. Urbanisation 
is increasing rapidly and approximately 34% of the Somaliland population is already living in towns, especially 
in Hargeisa. As there are no accurate statistics and no census has been carried out since the 1970s, 
the population number of Hargeisa is very unclear, with varying estimations from different organizations 
and agencies. Based on the number of permanent, temporary and illegal houses, the local administration 
estimates the population number at around 445,000. However, “the UN uses a planning figure of only 
300,000, while the Ministry of Planning works with a figure of 375,000 and the Water Development Authority 
estimates the population at around 600,000-700,000”15. 
10  See Bradbury 2008
11 See ICG 2009
12 Bryden and Farah 1996
13 In 2000, the Saudi Arabia, the main export destination for Somaliland livestock, imposed a ban on Somali livestock. The ban was 
only lifted in November 2009. See IRIN, 10.11.2009. 
14  Nenova 2004: 1; for more information on the social and economic recovery see Bradbury 2008: 137ff. 
15 King 2003: 14
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Many of the newcomers are returnees, rural migrants or people from other areas of Somalia and Ethiopia. 
While some of them have been displaced by the civil war in Southern Somalia, others came to seek 
employment and benefit from Hargeisa’s economic boom. There is also a rising number of rural migrants 
who moved to the city to escape drought and poverty. According to a survey carried out by the local 
NGO Dareen, Hargeisa hosts about 60% of the returnee population, most of whom are spontaneous 
returnees arriving between 1991 and 199716. Reportedly, there is also a growing number of Ethiopians 
passing through the city on their way to Puntland and Yemen. 
The distribution of clans within the town is largely the same since its origin during colonial times. Thus, 
Garhagais and Arab sub-clans inhabit the South of the valley, while the North of the valley is predominantly 
dwelled by Habar Awal sub-clans and Gabooye minority communities. However, since relations between the 
clans in Hargeisa are generally very good and free of tensions, the clear-cut separation of their settlements 
has become porous. People from different clans intermingle more frequently and some areas, especially at 
the city centre, have developed into more or less multi-clan settlements. Additionally, many non-Isaaq from 
the Dulbahante, Warsangeli, Gadarbursi and Hawiye clans have come back to Hargeisa. 
2.3.3 Burao
Unlike Hargeisa, which benefited from almost continued peace and stability since 1991, the recent history 
of Burao is very conflict ridden, whereby local dynamics between the two rival clans, the Habar Jeclo and 
the Habar Yonis, were influenced by conflicts at the national level. Clashes first broke out in January 1992, 
when Habar Yonis militias affiliated to the government of Abdirahman Ahmed Ali “Tuur” sought to disarm 
rival Habar Jeclo militias supporting the opposition. 
The second large-scale clan confrontation started in 1994. The Habar Yonis, who resented the dismissal 
of ‘Tuur’ and felt marginalized in the new configuration of powers after the Boroma conference, fought 
Habar Jeclo militias aligned to the new administration headed by President Egal. The conflict caused heavy 
destruction and the displacement of the civilian population on both sides. At the local level, a reconciliation 
process was initiated in 1996, while at the national level the Hargeisa conference in 1997 addressed some 
of the political grievances of the Habar Yonis. However, tensions between the competing clans in the city 
remain high. Accordingly, the city is strictly separated into clan territories, with the Habar Jeclo living in the 
East and the Habar Yonis in the West. The two clans merely intermingle. 
The local administration in Burao was slowly re-established in the aftermath of the conflict. Since most 
state resources are spent in Hargeisa, the administrative, political and economic centre of Somaliland, the 
capacities of state institutions in the Eastern city remain limited and clan structures continue to be very 
persistent. Moreover, its performance is hampered by the contest between the two dominant clans. Thus, 
if the Mayor is form the Habar Yonis, the regional Governor of Toghdheer region has to be from the Habar 
Jeclo. Politics in the city has remained unstable and since the first local elections in 2002, Burao has had 
four different Mayors, all of them from the Habar Yonis clan. 
Nevertheless, despite these problems the city has been rebuilt after the war and is again the most important 
administrative and commercial centre in the Eastern Region. When the conflict had ended in 1997 and the 
political situation in the town became more stable, people returned and started to invest in the rebuilding 
of their livelihoods. Key infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, water and sanitation systems were 
reconstructed and many social services, for example hospitals and schools, have been rehabilitated. For 
instance, Burao University is again one of the most important educational institutions in the country and 
16 Dareen 2005
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attracts young people from all over the region. Like everywhere else in Somaliland, in the absence of public 
funds, these initiatives were largely organized and financed by the private sector, wealthy individuals and 
communities. As for Hargeisa, the population number of Burao is unknown, but was estimated to be at 
around 80.000 or more. Also the economy of Burao has been revived, even though most businesses are 
based in the national capital. An impressive example is the soap factory outside the city, which produces 
different types of soaps for the Somaliland and the wider regional market. However, the town’s economy was 
hit very hard by the Saudi ban on Somali livestock in 2000 and only the steady flow of remittances prevented 
its economic decline. Currently, remittances are the largest source of income for the population. 
Because of (perceived) insecurity and clan tensions, international NGOs and UN agencies find it difficult to 
implement projects in the Eastern region. In 2000, the assassination of a German working for GTZ had set 
a blow on the hope of extending development activities to the Eastern regions. The successive events in 
2003 and 2004, when an Italian was shot in Boroma in the west, two aid workers were killed in Sheikh, a 
small town between Burao and Berbera, and a Kenyan women was shot on the road between Hargeisa 
and Burao had further aggravated the security situation in the East. In 2006, surveyors working for a UN-
Habitat Geographical Information Project were attacked and their equipment destroyed. The increased 
threat of terrorism after the bombings in Hargeisa in 2008 and the weakness of state institutions in the 
region have further contributed to the concerns of international organizations. Accordingly, while there are 
several NGOs working in the Eastern regions, only one international NGO is currently based in Burao. Most 
organisations have their headquarters in Hargeisa, where it is deemed more secure and where they have 
direct access to important ministries. Moreover, Hargeisa is not as remote as Burao and has an airport. 
The absence of the international community is a common complain among the residents of Burao and has 
fostered their ethos of self-reliance. 
3.  Urban Land Management in Somaliland: Laws and Institutions
3.1 Background: Urban Land Management in Somaliland
As explained elsewhere, the legal system in Somaliland is characterized by the parallel existence of three, 
sometimes overlapping, laws and legal institutions: the official courts based on state law, shari’a courts 
applying religious law and traditional councils of elders ruling according to customary law. This legal 
pluralism, however, concerns mainly the field of conflict resolution. For pro-active land management in the 
urban context, state institutions and laws, combined to a certain degree with religious shari’a principles, 
provide the most common legal framework. 
Traditional law, called xeer in Somali, “is remarkably well adapted for administering, managing and regulating 
common property”17, but it is weak and underdeveloped with regard to private land property. Thus, while 
xeer has always been the dominant law for land management in rural Somaliland, especially in the pastoral 
context, urban areas have mainly been administered by state institutions using official state law. 
The British colonial authorities introduced modern urban land administration in Hargeisa and Burao, as 
they started to issue entitlements for residence, commercial and farming properties in the emerging towns. 
With the first constitution of the Somali Republic, issued in June 1960, all land became nationalized to be 
managed by the administration. Under the democratic government, which in general had a liberal economic 
agenda, land transactions in urban areas increased, and in Hargeisa and Burao a small real estate market 
developed. This trend continued during military rule. Urban land could be leased for an unlimited period, 
17  PDRC 2003: 9, see also NRC et al.: 160
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but the state held several legal options to revoke these agreements. Due to corruption and nepotism, 
those with close ties to the ruling elite were often able to get access to valuable plots in the countries main 
urban centres. The decline of proper land management, especially after the lost Ogaden War in 1978, 
indicated the erosion of state authority and the privatisation and disintegration of its institutions, until it finally 
collapsed in 1991.
Since the Somaliland state still remains weak, clan affiliation is important to secure access to land and to 
guarantee tenure security, at least unofficially18. Customary clan rights therefore have to be considered in 
the planning and management of Somaliland’s town and cities19. Furthermore, traditional elders have also 
become important in conflict management in the urban context. Nevertheless, in the absence of customary 
laws and regulations regarding land in the urban context, elders take official land laws and ownership 
certificates into account in order to find solutions for land conflicts20. State institutions and laws are thus 
crucial for the management of land in urban contexts. 
Shari’a law has gained importance since the fall of the Barre regime and is thus to some degree integrated 
into the official state law. The Somaliland constitution says, “The laws of the nation shall be grounded on 
and shall not be contrary to Islamic shari’a”21. Regarding land, the shari’a specifies the following tenureships 22: 
	 	 •	 	 Mulk: full ownership
	 • Miri: state land. 
	 •	 Waqf: similar to a trust, used to create charitable endowments in perpetuity (e.g. hospitals/  
  schools)
	 •	 Mewat: “dead land”, which may be claimed by another for development
These principles, especially Mulk, Mirit and Mewat, are reflected in the Somaliland Urban Land Management 
Law. It has also been suggested that in the rural context the concept of Mulk has recently been used to 
claim land23. Furthermore, independent shari’a courts are increasingly gaining importance in the settlement 
of land disputes.
3.2 The Official Legal System and Institutional Set-up
According to Land Management Law No. 17, passed in 2001 and slightly amended in 2008, all land 
belongs to the state. Land management in Somaliland is divided between the national and the local 
administrative level. The National Urban Planning Institute (NUPI) under the Ministry of Public Works is 
assigned to draft urban land use plans. Subsequently, these plans have to be approved by the national 
government, represented by the National Urban Planning Board (NUPB)24 and activated by Presidential 
decree. The municipalities, in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Works, are authorised to allocate, 
issue and register land and landownership certificates according to the master plan25. Concerning land 
conflict management, Law No. 17 stipulates that a technical committee is to be established that includes 
national as well as local institutions26. 
18 See part III, section 2.
19 Barry and Bruyas 2009: 45
20 See section 6.1.2
21 Somaliland Constitution, Article 4
22 See Sait and Lim 2006.
23 NRC et al. 2008: 157
24 The NUPB consists of the Ministers of Health, Agriculture, Water and Mines, Interior Affairs, Environment and Rural Development, 
Communication and Postal Service, and is chaired by the Minister of Public Works
25 National Urban Land Planning/ Proclamation ( Law No. 17, 2001): Articles 1 - 4
26 Ministry of Public Works and Housing, Municipality, Local Council, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Religion and 
Endowments, Ministry of Environ and Pastoral Development. (Ibid.: Article 28)
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3.2.1 The National Urban Planning Institute and the Town Master Plan
Law No. 17 stipulates that an urban land use plan is to be drawn by the National Urban Planning Institute 
(NUPI), an independent institution headed by the Ministry of Public Works and divided into different 
administrative levels (national, zonal, district). Thereby, it has to demarcate residential, industrial, commercial 
and public zones. Public zones are meant for administrative buildings, education-, health-, electricity- and 
water facilities as well as roads (etc.). 30 Percent of residential zones are to be allocated for such public 
purposes. Furthermore, the law states that the plan has to ensure that “urban land for city expansion shall 
not exceed 5 km catchments radius from the city corporate build up area”27.
Nevertheless, legally recognized farms, rain fed as well as irrigated ones, may be “converted into urban 
plots due to city expansion while land tenure remains constant”, whereas, “mountains, sloppy hill sides and 
streams within the expansion areas of a city are not to be considered as a farm”. According to amendments 
in 2008, the Master Plan can be amended upon the request of a Mayor28. 
3.2.2 The Role of the Local Administration
The local government is authorised to allocate, issue and register land and landownership certificates 
based on the land use plan (town master plan) drawn by the NUPI and approved by the NUPB29. Thereby, 
however, they have to collaborate with the Ministry of Public Works, which issues construction permits and 
heads the NUPI and the NUPB. The duties and regulations of the municipalities are stipulated as follows: 
According to Law No. 17, “Registration of land is to be based on the availability of the plot tenure certificate 
or judgment from the court that witnesses its ownership. It must be listed in both the local governments and 
Ministry of Public Works registrations”30. Generally, there exist two types of land plots: ‘temporary’ structures 
(e.g. with huts and traditional materials) and permanent structures (with stone-, cement- buildings etc.), 
both of which must be approved by the municipality authorities. In accordance with the Master Plan, it is 
also in charge of approving the conversion of ‘temporary’ plots into ‘permanent’ plots31. 
Moreover, it is authorised to allocate land to individuals, national- or international organisations, and to 
“specific projects that will enhance the national welfare”32. However, a person who already owns a plot in 
the town is not eligible to be allocated another plot by the local government33. Land allocations have to be 
published and opposing claims have to be brought in within 60 days. The Ministry of Public Works and the 
NUPI have to record the number of allocated plots. Legally recognized landowners may sell or otherwise 
transfer their plot34. 
Ownership titles must be requested and taxes have to be paid before construction permission is to be 
granted from the Ministry of Public Works. The construction has to fit in into the overall land use plan and 
needs to take place within one year after receiving the ownership title (for permanent structures). If, after 
two years, a person has failed to pay tax and develop the plot, the ownership title is to be revoked. For 
temporary structures, the period is three months35.
 
27 National Urban Land Planning/ Proclamation (Law No. 17, 2001), Article 5.
28  Ibid, Article 7, see also the amendments to the law (2008)
29  Ibid, Article 1 and 2
30  Ibid., Article 27
31  Ibid., Article 10, 11, 12
32  Ibid., Article 16
33 Ibid., Article 15
34  Ibid., Article 26
35 ibid., Articles 12, 13, and 14
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Generally, “all permanent and temporary structures that are developed without passing the legal process 
commissioned herein this law are to be recognized as illegal structures”36, giving the municipality authorities 
the legal power to demolish them without granting compensation. However, in case entire neighbourhoods 
have to be relocated, the authorities will cover the costs for this undertaking. Moreover, the Mayor in 
consultation with the ULPB has the authority to confiscate any legally recognized private plots for public 
use. Thereby, however, the owner has to be fully compensated and given an alternative plot of a similar 
size37. 
Regarding conflict management, Law No 17 says that a technical committee, consisting of representatives 
of local and national institutions who are nominated by their respective institutions for a term of one year, 
is to be established. The decisions of the committee are to be used by the court as a witness. Complains 
against its verdicts can be brought in within 15 days, otherwise the decision is to be implemented by the 
law enforcing authorities38. 
3.2.3 The Role of the Local Council in Land and Conflict Management
As seen above, the local administration is the most important institution when it comes to land management 
in urban areas. It is therefore necessary to briefly describe how, according to the law, it is regulated and 
controlled, and to analyse the responsibilities and duties of the Local Council.
 
Under the Regions and District Law (Law No. 23/2002)39, Somaliland has a decentralised structure of 
governance. The Local Council, which is the governing body at the local level, is instructed to implement 
national and regional policies and to plan and regulate a wide range of public affairs40. It has a Land 
Subcommittee, which is “responsible for the use of land for all purposes”41 and has “to propose the 
appropriation of privately vacant land for public purposes”42. Furthermore, it also has a Peace and Conciliation 
Subcommittee, which is “responsible for the resolution of disputes arising within the District and for the 
maintenance of the public order”43. 
The Local Council is subordinate to the Executive Committee, which consists of the Mayor, who heads 
the Local Council, the Deputy Mayor and the Executive Secretary, who controls the budget and is 
appointed directly by the central government44. However, the Council has the authority to oversee the local 
administration and the Mayor in order to guarantee that they carry out their activities and duties according 
to the law45. It also makes resolutions that need to be implemented by the Mayor, who is also elected by the 
Local Council. All by-laws and resolutions need to be approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
3.3 Administrative Structures in Hargeisa and Burao
Hargeisa municipality has five districts, each of which is sub divided into several sections/ wards. Land 
issues, for example the registration of ownership titles, are referred to the District authorities, but records 
are kept at the central office in the municipality. 
36 Ibid., Article 20
37  Ibid., Articles 21, 22 and 23
38  Ibid., Article 28
39 The Law was amended and extended in 2007. It now runs to more than 100 Articles, but many of them remain unchanged. In 
this section, the researchers refer to the 2002 English language translation of the 2002 Law, as there is no translation of the 
Amendments available yet.  
40  See ibid., Article 20, 1-24
41  Ibid., Article 32
42 Ibid., Article 24
43 Ibid., Article 32
44 Ibid., Articles 17, 19, 22, 23 and 32
45 Ibid., Article 24
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Figure 1: Urban divisions in Hargeisa
District Geographical location Sections/Wards
Ga’an Libah Northeast Sheikh Yussuf, Sheikh Madar, Mohamed 
Harbi, Sheikh Nour, Warabe Salan
26 June North-Central Durya, Almis, Aingal, Gol-jano
Ibrahim Kodbour Northwest Hero-Awr, Lihle, Gul-allah, Jigjiga Yar
Mohamoud Haibeh Southeast Jame’o weyn, Burao-Duray, Sheikh Shukri, 
Qudha-dheer, Mohamed Moge
Ahmed Dhege Southwest Mohamed Ali, Farah Nour, 18 May, Sheikh 
Muse Du’aleh, Abdi Idan (Ayaha)
Hargeisa municipality has a Land Department that regulates and allocates land and issues building permits. 
An independent section is in charge of land transfers and building permit registration. A third section, the 
Department for Physical Assets and Land Tenure, issues title deeds for buildings. In Burao, the administrative 
institutions regarding land are similar (see Figure 2). The role of the Local Council regarding land issues is 
different between the two cities. While in Hargeisa, the Local Council is only responsible for mediating 
in land conflicts, in Burao it is also involved in land planning and landownership verification processes. 
It thus seems to be more influential than its counterpart in the national capital. However, attempts are 
underway to reduce the powers of the Burao Council, indicating the unclear role of the Local Council in land 
management affairs and its relation to the Mayor and the local administration46. The Local Council has 25 
members in Hargeisa and 21 in Burao, including the Mayor47, and is elected for a five-year term. Because of 
the electoral crisis over the presidential elections, however, the local elections originally scheduled for 2005 
have been delayed several times and are yet to take place.
Figure 2: Administrative structure of Burao municipality
46 See section 5.4
47  Regions and District Law, Article 25
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4.  Root Causes and Problems
4.1 Disorganized Resettlement
After the end of the civil war at the beginning of the 1990s, returnees and migrants simply settled wherever 
they found space, including public land, vacated plots or in destroyed buildings. Thus, in the absence 
of town planning and effective land administration, new settlements have emerged spontaneously, often 
lacking adequate urban infrastructure and social services. Additionally, there is no distinction between 
commercial and residential zones, which in some cases puts considerable risks on the population. For 
instance fuel stations, which were previously restricted and had to fulfil certain security requirements, are 
nowadays established all over the towns without any regulations and safety prescriptions. In addition, roads 
are often too small or in a very bad shape and in some districts there are no roads at all. Households are not 
linked to electricity, sanitation and water systems, and some districts do not have enough schools.
These problems are affecting poorer as well as wealthier households, since they are generally living in 
the same neighbourhoods. However, while wealthier households can at least afford to purchase essential 
services on the free market (e.g. electricity, water), low-income households often lack resources to do so. 
The urban poor, especially returnees and other recent migrants, thus suffer most from the absence of urban 
planning and the worsening condition of public urban infrastructure in Hargeisa and Burao. 
A Socio-Economic Survey of Somalia provides some insights into the living conditions of many people in 
urban areas in Somalia and Somaliland48. According to its findings, unemployment is around 60%, while 
60.7% live on less than $US 2 a day and 43.2% living in extreme poverty. Many of them live in makeshift 
houses and huts, which are not suitable for urban conditions. Sanitation infrastructure is very poor and grey 
water is often disposed of on the streets and in the environment. Companies and individuals collect waste, 
but there exist no final disposal site. Furthermore, many households lack access to water systems and 
thus rely on water from shallow wells delivered by street vendors. But this water is often unclean, leading to 
frequent outbreaks of cholera. Electricity as well as telecommunication and other services are provided by 
private enterprises and are thus often too expensive for the urban poor49. 
Obviously, although Hargeisa and Burao have largely been rebuilt since the end of the war, many people 
still live in poverty. Urban planning, including the provision of social services and infrastructure for the urban 
poor, is therefore serious challenges for the municipality authorities. 
4.2 Land Grabbing
After the Barre Regime was ousted and the SNM had established its authority, people moved back to 
Hargeisa and Burao rebuilding their homes and beginning a new life. Thereby, they made use of the absence 
of a strong state and an effective government and grabbed away large patches of private and public land. 
4.2.1 Private Land
In Hargeisa, land grabbers primarily targeted the land of former officials of the Barre regime, often claiming 
that it had previously been obtained by illegal means. Land grabbing also had a clan dimension. The land of 
many non-Isaaq, who had fled the country for their own security, was grabbed away by the returning Isaaq 
population, often on the false pretext that they were associated with the military regime. Ahmed Dhegah 
district in Hargeisa is a case in point. A large number of Gadabursi previously lived in this area, but most of 
their properties were taken over by individuals from the Arab sub-clan of the Isaaq, which is the dominant 
clan in the area. 
48 UNDP and The World Bank 2003
49 Atkinson and Couté 2003: 5-11
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In Mogadishu, conflicts related to land grabbing during the civil war are named as a major obstacle to 
peace50. In Somaliland, however, most of theses conflicts seem to have already been resolved and those 
who had their land grabbed away were paid small compensations. Despite the fact that payments were 
considerably lower than the market value of the plots, it helped to diffuse tensions between the clans. 
Nevertheless, some of these conflicts are still lingering on and have not been resolved yet, especially in 
Erigavo.
 
Erigavo is inhabited by Isaaq clans (Habar Yonis and Habar Jeclo) and Harti clans (Dulbahante and 
Warsangeli). In the aftermath of the war the Isaaq took over land and houses belonging to the Harti, since 
they were seen as supporters of the former military regime. During peace conferences between the clans 
in the early 1990s, elders agreed that all property stolen during the war, including land, has to be returned 
to its original owners. However, many Isaaq claimed that they were indeed the original owners but had their 
land confiscated by the military regime. As it proved impossible to settle these disputes, the clans decided 
to postpone the resolution process for the time being and to wait until a strong administration has been 
re-established. Such conflicts are called “Taagan”, meaning “the case is still open and will be solved later 
on”. Taagan is one of the main root cause for land-based conflicts in Erigavo. In Burao, however, where less 
non-Isaaq and regime officials lived, land grabbing was more confined to public land. 
4.2.2 Public Land
Shortly after the civil war, returnees used the power vacuum that the disintegration of the Somali state 
had left to take over every available piece of land. Spearheaded by armed militias, they forced their way 
to occupy public land and buildings, such as government offices, schools and parks. Later on, a growing 
number of urban migrants joined them. Even today, almost two decades after the end of the civil war, large 
patches of public land are still under their control. A case in point is the State House area in Hargeisa, which 
has become a preferred settlement for the urban poor. 
Wealthier land grabbers constructed houses on government plots in order to strengthen their ownership 
claims. Because clan pressure obliges the authorities to pay compensation not only for the land, but also 
for the houses built on it, illegally constructed houses thus serve as a de facto insurance against eviction. 
Re-claiming public land, especially those areas occupied by returnees, is one of the top priorities of the 
municipalities in Hargeisa and Burao. 
4.3 Unclear Landownership and the Booming Real Estate Market
Nowadays, land grabbing is related to the thriving real estate market and the rising value of land. The 
economic boom that has taken place since 1991, based on the inflow of money and resources from the 
Diaspora, the growth of regional trade and the influx of people from all over the region, has made Hargeisa 
a commercial hub in the Horn of Africa. Investments in land property have increased considerably over the 
last years, leading to a steady expansion of the city and its real estate market51. 
The Somaliland diaspora community and their remittances are the driving force behind this development. 
Overall, they transfer between $700 million–1 billion annually to their country of origin52. It is estimated that 
Hargeisa alone receives around $5 Million per month in remittances, of which one third is used to fund 
investment in the construction business53. In Burao, interviewees even suggested that up to 90 percent 
50 De Waal 2007
51  Barry and Bruyas 2009: 44
 52 Nenova 2004: 5
53 King 2003: 26. For further information on the economic andsocial impact of the diaspora in Somaliland see Bradbury 2008: 174-
179, Lindley 2007 and Maimbo 2006.
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of land transactions are financed with remittances. As a result, the value of land is increasing. According 
to Bradbury54, between 1992 and 2003 a plot of land of 18 by 24 metres in Sha’ab area near the Mansur 
Hotel had risen from US$300 to $9,000. In other areas, values were going up by at least 10 times over the 
same period. In summertime rents usually increase considerably due to the visits of Somalilanders from the 
diaspora. Consequently, public greed for land is increasing.
Today, even small patches of land between plots as well as open spaces beside roads are grabbed away for 
personal use. Sometimes this land is then sold to another person, creating conflicts between the new and 
the original owner of that plot. The problem is further aggravated by unclear landownership circumstances. 
As many legal documents were lost during the war, it is often very “difficult to identify the rightful owner of a 
property of land”55. Consequently, “In the absence of reliable legal documents, title deeds for land are often 
forged to strengthen illegal ownership claims”56. “Because of the difficulties for legal owners to prove their 
case, these conflicts are often solved outside the courts, where illegal claimants regularly receive pay-offs 
or some land. The perpetuation of false claims thereby becomes worthwhile and as a result, it is nowadays 
a common practice for personal enrichment. This is signified by the Somali motto “ku qabso ku qadi 
meyside”, meaning: “Make a claim, albeit unjust, and you shall end up gaining something”57. 
Property brokers add to the confusing situation, since they often agree to sell a plot without having checked 
if its ownership is disputed. Thus, it even happened that public land was sold on this way. As there are 
no laws regulating the land market and the business of property brokers, these problems are likely to 
continue58. 
Land grabbing and unclear landownership are a source of many conflicts in Hargeisa and Burao and are 
therefore often perceived to be the most serious problems facing urban land management in Somaliland. 
5. Land Management: Strengths, Weaknesses and Challenges
Urban land management in Somaliland is still evolving. In Hargeisa, land administration was re-established 
after the Borama conference in 1993, while in Burao local land management structures have only been 
functioning since 1997/98, when the conflict between the Habar Yonis and the Habar Jeclo had been 
settled. Since then the municipality authorities have improved land administration, tackled the problems 
of land grabbing, implemented a more effective system of landownership registration and a Cadastral 
Survey and sought to better plan the development and expansion of the two cities. This section describes 
and analyses current land management systems, practises and efforts in relation to the problems named 
before. It also points out the weaknesses and problems that have so far hampered the administration of 
urban land. 
Urban Land Management Challenges in Somaliland
	 •	 Improving	land	planning
	 •	 Providing	social	services	and	urban	infrastructure,	especially	to	the	poor
	 •	 Resettling	returnees	and	reclaiming	public	land
	 •	 Clarifying	landownership	and	preventing	land	grabbing
	 •	 Regulating	the	real	estate	market
54 Bradbury 2008: 161
56 Academy for Peace Development/Institute for Development and Peace 2008: 16
57 Ibid.: 17
58 Ibid.: 17
59 Academy for Peace and Development et al 2009: 49-50
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5.1 Legal Gaps and Shortcomings
With the Land Law No. 17, the Somaliland authorities have obviously taken a first step to regulate urban land 
management, especially considering that it is the first land law since the disintegration of the Barre regime 
in 1991. The law has created a legal framework for local and national institutions that, though imperfect, 
regulates its practices and defines its duties with regard to the most urgent problems in urban Somaliland: 
town planning, land grabbing, returnees and the problem of resettlement, the legalization and registration 
of landownership and the resolution of land-based conflict. Law No. 17, thus includes stipulations that were 
created in order to prevent land grabbing and avoid land speculation. For instance, town expansion and the 
allocation of urban land are limited to a “5 km catchments radius from the city corporate build up area”59, 
as to prevent land grabbing at the fringes of towns. Nevertheless, despite being a first step into the right 
direction, Law No. 17 still has many gaps and shortcomings. 
First, the process of drafting the land management plan is highly centralized in the national government and 
offers no options for other actors to participate. Especially the local governments, which are the institutions 
that are most involved in land management affairs, are neither represented in the NUPB, nor in the NUPI. 
In fact, the NUPI is to be organized at different administrative levels, but no stipulations are made about the 
integration of the local government into its bodies. Instead, the law suggests that incorporation is not even 
envisioned, since the NUPI is supposed to “oversee the local government”60. The law also lacks provisions 
on what to do if there is no Master Plan, as it is still the case in Somaliland.
 
Second, many of the institutions and sub-institutions, including their respective powers and regulations, 
which are needed for effective urban land administration, are not mentioned in the law at all. Instead, they 
are only very generally referred to as “local authorities” or the “Ministry of Public Works”. This leads to 
overlapping institutional responsibility and authorities. Furthermore, these institutions may have different 
interests, which could further complicate land management. 
Third, the process of land registration remains unclear. There are vague regulations concerning the 
administrative procedures, but no statements on what information an ownership certificate contains or 
“what document should be brought or which form should be filled in”61to obtain it. 
Fourth, the function of the Land Conflict Management Committee and its relations to the judicial structure 
are not obvious. For instance, it is not clear when the committee is to be called upon and how its decisions 
are to be considered by the courts. It is said that the committee is only a witness in the court, but its 
decisions are nevertheless binding. 
Obviously, Law No. 17 is more like a legal outline that remains unclear at many points. While this provides 
the institutions involved with a certain degree of flexibility to adopt their practices to specific local settings, 
it also sets the ground for arbitrariness, corruption and institutional competition. 
5.2 Institutional Competition and Poor Planning 
Institutional competition over land ownership between various state authorities complicates land management 
and planning in Somaliland towns and cities. As explained in section 5.1, the law is rather unclear about the 
relations between state agencies, thus resulting in overlapping responsibilities and authorities. Moreover, 
control over land is an important source of income for state institutions and corrupt officials, as plots can be 
59 Urban Land Proclamation (Law No. 17): Article 5
60 National Urban Land Planning/ Proclamation (Law No. 17, 2001), Article 2
61 Bruyas 2006: 31
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sold and rented out. Hence, instead of cooperating and developing joint land management strategies, state 
institutions often rival among each other and with the public over control of- and access to land. 
For example, the local government and the Ministry of Agriculture claim control of land at the fringes of 
towns and it happens that both institutions issue ownership titles for the same parcel of land to different 
individuals. Additionally, control over public land in the Sha’ab area in Hargeisa, is contested between the 
local authorities and the Ministry of Public Works, which owns many properties in that area.
The city master plan, which is to be drawn by the NUPB, is thought to regulate, structure and organize land 
use in order to facilitate the provision of urban and social services. Nevertheless, due to the institutional 
competition mentioned above, there currently exists no Land Master Plan, neither for Hargeisa nor for 
Burao. Consequently, since Law No. 17 does not clarify how to plan and regulate urban land in the absence 
of that plan, the expansion and development of the two cities continues to be rather disorganized and 
spontaneous. Long term strategic planning seems to be missing. 
Under such conditions, it is up to the municipalities to demarcate land for specific purposes. But as there 
are no regulations regarding the process and the institutions involved, land demarcation is currently merely 
transparent. In Hargeisa, it seems that the municipality Executive Committee primarily manages most public 
land without the participations of the district Councillors. In Burao, however, the Local Council seems to be 
more involved in land planning.
 
Nevertheless, according to Local Councillors interviewed in Hargeisa and Burao, the biggest challenge 
to effective land planning is the fact that state institutions lack the capacities to implement and enforce 
existing laws and regulations and prevent land grabbing. As a result, the state does not have any land 
to plan with and can neither resettle returnees, nor establish new roads or sanitation facilities. The only 
source of land currently available to the municipality is the 30 percent it demands from newly allocated or 
registered properties, which are mostly located at the outskirts of the cities. In Burao and Hargeisa, the 
local governments were able to use some of this land as a resettlement site for returnees, but this is still 
insufficient to solve the problem of scarce public land in the town. 
5.3 Clarifying Landownership 
5.3.1 Improved Land Ownership Registration
In both Burao and Hargeisa, local authorities were able to reinstall regulations for the issuing and registration 
of ownership titles for land and buildings. These regulations are probably “adaptations of procedures 
introduced under the former British administration and continued while Somaliland was part of Somalia”62. 
Officials at the municipality confirmed that most current land management procedures and systems had 
already been in place during the rule of Siad Barre and were simply re-enacted after the civil war. While it 
was previously very easy to obtain title deeds, resulting in rampant land grabbing and land conflicts, the 
current system is much more complicated and involves a lot of cross checking by different departments 
and officials. According to interviewees, this has certainly reduced land grabbing by individuals and groups. 
Consequently, as demonstrated in figure 4, the number of new title deeds issued by the municipality has 
been reduced considerably since 2001.
The legalization and registration of landownership is a complicated process that involves different departments 
at the municipality and the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation. “A series of inspections to examine, 
62 Barry and Bruyas 2009: 45
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inter alia, whether claims to the parcel are uncontested and/or if disputes have been resolved; whether 
the boundaries are uncontested or boundary disputes have been resolved; whether boundary dimensions 
conform to plan dimensions; whether taxes have been paid, and the property does not fall in a planned 
development, such as a roadway or school”63. Thereby, pre-existing ownership titles have to be confirmed 
by municipality officials and neighbours to prevent the forging of documents. Figure 5 documents this 
process in Burao. In Hargeisa, the system is similar, except that the Local Council is not involved in the 
verification process and does not sign the title deed. Instead, the document is only signed by the Mayor 
and the Executive Secretary. 
As soon as the verification examinations are concluded successfully, a simple legalization certificate is 
issued, including the compulsory construction permit from the Ministry of Public Works. The information 
is registered in a computerized data set at the municipality, which also keeps a copy of the preliminary 
ownership certificate64. When the building has been erected, an ownership document can be registered 
against the building, not the land. To obtain this document, which contains far more information than the 
basic certificate issued before, is not compulsory and in Hargeisa in 2006, only 3000 of such documents 
had been issued, out of approximately 59.000 buildings. However, with the registration of the more 
rudimentary ownership certificate the administration has re-established a cadastral system that serves as a 
basic information system for the management and regulation of landownership. 
Obviously, local authorities in Hargeisa and Burao have shown willingness and great efforts to improve 
land management, especially by seeking to clarify landownership and re-establishing a system of land 
registration. Nevertheless, there are still a lot of remaining problems and challenges that hamper effective 
land administration in urban areas. Not all of these problems seem to be solvable in the near future.
Figure 3: Number of new title deeds issued for buildings in Hargeisa
District 1999 2000 2001 2002
26 June 124 94 131 48
Ga’an Libah 91 188 43 18
Ibrahim Kodbour 102 188 64 18
Mohamoud Haibeh 43 51 16 17
Ahmed Dhege 31 48 11 11
Total 391 562 265 132
(Source: Hargeisa municipality Statistical Abstract 2003: 24)
63  Ibid.: 46, see also Bruyas 2006: 39ff.
64 See also Bruyas 2006: 41
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Figure 4: The landownership verification process in Burao
Urban Land Management and Land Conflicts in Somaliland 27
5.3.2 Remaining Problems: the Contested Nature of Landownership
Any system of land registration and land management is hampered by the fact that land, and in particular 
land tenure, are still very sensitive and contested issues in urban Somaliland. As many plots in Hargeisa and 
Burao are still disputed, a compulsory registration and therewith a final clarification of landownership could 
trigger new conflicts. This is especially the case in Burao, where peace between the Habar Jeclo and Habar 
Yonis is still fragile. Early in the 1990s, the Mayor of Hargeisa had reportedly announced that all landowners 
need to register their property, but very few actually seemed to have followed his order. Also the urban land 
management law stipulates that only new buildings or properties have to be registered properly, while old 
buildings, constructed before the war, are not to be registered again. It is also not compulsory to register 
land transactions such as sale or the inheritance of property. Accordingly, many buildings and plots have 
not been registered yet. 
In 2004 Hargeisa municipality, supported by UN-Habitat as part of the UNDP governance and financial 
services programme, set up a GIS (Geographic Information System) aimed at increasing the tax revenues 
of the local government. Thereby, building footprints taken from satellite images were digitalized and its 
dimensions subsequently checked on the ground. The system could therefore also improve land registration 
and provide tenure security, but due to the difficult situation regarding landownership, it is currently only 
used for taxation. Consequently, not the owner or the holder of the title is taxed but the inhabitants of a 
building. 
In Burao, GIS had to be cancelled, since it increased tensions and led to an attack on one of the surveyors65. 
Starting in 2005, about 30% of the buildings had already been recorded when rumours spread that the data 
would be transferred to foreign secret service agencies. An Islamic group then prevented the surveying of 
one of their houses and thereby destroyed the equipment of the GIS team. Obviously, the problems with the 
implementation of GIS in Burao are not caused by prevailing clan tensions, but are related to the suspicion 
against foreigners, in particular Western NGOs and agencies. This suggests that also future attempts to 
improve the registration of land and clarify land ownership will remain very complicated.
 
5.4 The Controversial Role of the Local Councils
Generally, the Local Councils can play an important role in land- and conflict management. Since the 
Councillors are elected democratically, they appear to be accountable to the population and its work is 
generally respected. In Hargeisa and Burao, interviewees and participants in Focus Group Discussions 
generally emphasized that although Local Councillors often lack technical expertise in land management 
affairs, they tend to benefit from their involvement in local affairs and are thus often able to solve problems 
related to landownership. Additionally, it was noted that the current Councillors are gaining experience in 
land issues, since they have been in office since 2002.
In Burao, the Land Subcommittee has been active in efforts to safeguard public land from land grabbing 
and has succeeded to dismantle some illegal structures. It is also drawn into consultations with the 
Executive Committee of the municipality when it comes to land planning at the fringes of the town and 
the resettlement of returnees. Thereby, the Councillors act as links between the administration and the 
people, participating in the negotiations between them and ensuring that decisions are acceptable to 
all stakeholders. Furthermore, the committee often carries out the verification of landownership in the 
registration and legalization process. 
65 Barry and Bruyas 2009: 48
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This, however, has led to the current dispute with the Land Department of the municipality and the Mayor, 
who complain that the Councillors have taken over their executive responsibilities and that their involvement 
complicates the verification and registration process. Following Article 43 of the amended Regions and 
District Law, which stipulates that the Local Council is not allowed to sign any document related to the 
verification of landownership entitlements, the Mayor banned these practices. 
However, the Local Councillors refuse to obey to the orders of the Mayor. Referring to Article 36 of the 
same law, they argue that the Local Council can draw its own by-laws in order to uphold peace and 
stability and raise the efficiency of the local governments. The Chairmen of the Land Subcommittee 
thus justifies their involvement in the verification process as a pre-emptive measure to prevent illegal land 
grabbing and to maintain peace and stability. Furthermore, he says that the by-laws of Burao municipality, 
which were endorsed by the Mayor, had legalized this practice. The dispute has not been resolved yet and 
the Local Council continues to sign title deeds.
 
In Hargeisa, the Local Council is not so much involved in land management or the landownership verification 
process and hence there is no dispute between the Councillors and the administration. Nevertheless, 
also in Hargeisa, concerns were raised about their role in land management. According to a participant 
in a working group meeting, the Local Councillors attempt to wield executive powers and “behave like 
Mayors”. Seeking to influence decision-making process, they interfere in administrative procedures and 
often squabble among each other. So far, they have not drawn any by-laws regarding land or conflict 
management. Their impact on land management, the Working Group concluded, is thus sometimes rather 
negative. 
On the other hand, however, the Councillors suggested that the Somaliland people are not accustomed to 
democracy and that they have wrong expectations of what a Councillor can do. Since the Councillors were 
elected democratically, the parties choose candidates that were popular with and responsive to their clans. 
As a result, the current representatives face pressure from their particular constituencies and their parties, 
and therefore, they are often unable to work for the benefit of the whole community. Moreover, they are 
sometimes overwhelmed by their tasks, especially when it comes to conflict management.
Article 43 of the Regions and District Law (Law No 23/2002, as amended in 2007) 
It is stipulated under Article 43 of the above-mentioned law that the Local Council is not allowed to carry 
out the following activities:
1. To resume fully the responsibilities and duties of the municipal departments.
2. To sign any documents relating to:
 a) Land allocation.
 b) Landownership entitlements.
 c) Verification of landownership inspection.
 d) Revenue collection and disbursements.
3. To give orders directed to local government departments, operation sites and
   employees.
4. To promulgate by-laws.
5. To authorise tax exemption.
(See: Xeerka Gobollada Iyo Degmooyinka: Xeer LR. 23/2002 & 2007). Translated from Somali into 
English by the Land-based Conflict team)
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5.5 Weak State Authority and Incompetent Officials
There have been some successful attempts by the local governments in Hargeisa and Burao to claim 
back public land grabbed away by individuals. For instance, in Hargeisa, the municipality dismantled illegal 
structures set up by war veterans of the Somali National Movement (SNM), and in a case in Burao, it was 
decided to convert a land illegally grabbed away into a religious endowment and to build a mosque on it. 
Nevertheless, the weakness of the state, its low institutional capacities and incompetent officials so far 
hamper effective land management in the two cities. 
The legal process for obtaining an ownership certificate is continuously disregarded, with the administration 
either unwilling or unable to uphold the law. For instance, instead of first applying for an ownership certificate 
and then developing the plot, as stipulated in the law, people first grab the land and seek to legalize 
ownership afterwards. During the night, they demarcate plots with stones and shrubs or they even set up 
stone walls to fence it off. This contradicts Article 21 of Law No. 17, which clearly states “illegal structures 
are not to be used as mechanisms to obtain a land from the local governments and their relocation have 
no compensation”.
Instead of preventing such practices, the authorities often participate and make their own business with 
land grabbing. Public land is an important source of income for state authorities and is therefore often 
sold to businesspersons and investors. Sometimes even public facilities such as roads or land reserved 
for schools are not spared. Speculation on land through the proliferation of farms and enclosures on the 
periphery of the city is partly facilitated by corrupt individuals in the Ministry of Agriculture, who allocate land 
for agricultural purpose at the fringes of the city. Later on, the farms are converted into urban real estates. 
Thus, at the outskirts of Hargeisa and Burao, large areas have already been divided into plots and allocated 
to individuals and business people66. 
Furthermore, state institutions often lack the capacities to enforce the law and prevent land grabbing. 
Fearing public unrest, they tend to abstain from dismantling illegal structures. The problem of low state 
capacities is even more apparent in Burao, where its institutions are generally weaker than in the capital. 
The Departments of Public Works and Land in both cities are understaffed, untrained and lack modern 
equipment. As a result, they have difficulties performing their tasks. 
These administrative shortcomings undermine public trust in state institutions and regulations. People thus 
tend to keep state officials at distance and instead of following due administrative procedures, which are 
commonly neither understood nor trusted, they, seek to manage affairs among themselves. This attitude 
is strengthened by a general mistrust against the state, which stems from the negative experiences made 
during the time of dictatorship, when the state was privatized by officials and degenerated into an instrument 
of personal enrichment and suppression. 
Moreover, poor land management and corruption are often a source of conflicts, for example when 
“employees of the municipalities issue dual ownership entitlements for a single plot of land”67, which can 
cause conflict between the two owners who both hold legal entitlement documents.
 
66 Academy for Peace and Development 2006b: 12; Academy for Peace and Development/Institute for Development and Peace 
2008: 18; Academy for Peace and Development et al. 2009: 51; Bruyas 2006: 14
67  Academy for Peace and Development et al. 2009: 51
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5.6 Resettling Returnees: Problems and Challenges
As said in section 4.2 and 5.2, resettling returnees is one of the most important challenges for the municipalities 
in order to reclaim public land to be used for social and administrative purposes. This, however, is a very 
difficult task. Being protected by their clans, illegal settlers enjoy a rather high degree of tenure security. 
Hence, when the army sought to evict returnees from a military zone, the settlers overran the barracks and 
destroyed some military equipment. The authorities therefore try to avoid confrontations with them, as this 
could easily become a clan issue, fuelling (clan) tensions and threatening the fragile peace.
Accordingly, illegal squatters do have the power to bargaining with the authorities, who need to provide land 
and adequate housing for resettlement in order to convince them to vacate the land. Their tenure security 
is also included in Law No. 17, which says that if an “entire neighbourhood”68 is to be evicted, the state has 
to allocate an alternative plot and cover the costs for resettlement.
Since the administration has neither land to provide instead nor financial resources to cover the costs, the 
resettlement of returnees is very complicated and rarely takes place. One such case is the settlement in 
Freedom Park. As it was only a small village with few people, the municipality was able to provide land and 
clear the place from illegal structures. In Burao, the municipality authorities carved out land from enclosure 
owners as resettlement sites for returnees. Housing and sanitation facilities were financed by NGOs, and the 
United Nations World for Food Programme (WFP) currently hands out food rations. The two resettlement 
sites, Ali Hussein and Kosar neighbourhoods, are named after SNM veterans and are mainly inhabited by 
people form the Habar Yonis and the Ise Musa. 
In other cases, however, such resettlement efforts have not been successful. In 2005/2006, the municipality 
of Hargeisa tried to resettle some returnees from the State House area to a new settlement in Ayaha, at 
the outskirts of Hargeisa. This was supported by a housing project implemented by UN-HABITAT and the 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). However, despite offering adequate housing and infrastructure, the 
project failed to clear the targeted area from illegal settlers. 
First, the new settlements were to too small to host all returnees. Second, its environmental and economic 
setting proved to be very unattractive. Being located at the fringes of the city in a rocky and rather 
uncomfortable area, Ayaha is too far away from job opportunities and the pleasant life of Hargeisa’s vibrant 
The Influence of Clans in Land Management
Due to the weakness of the state, clans have a lot of influence on decision-making process within 
the local and national administration. In Burao, land management is therefore negatively affected by 
the prevailing tensions between the Habar Jeclo and the Habar Yonis. The administration is divided 
between the two clans, with officials only working in their respective clan territory of the city. Also the 
security forces are divided in that way. The police have two separate divisions, one Habar Yonis and 
one Habar Jeclo, with the overall commander coming from the Iise Musa sub-clan of the Habar Awal 
in order to ensure impartiality. Since the administration always has to balance the competing interests 
of the Habar Jeclo and the Habar Yonis, land management within each clan settlement is easier than 
between them. Also in Hargeisa, clan competition is hampering effective land management. Members 
of the Local Council admitted that they see themselves as clan representatives and therefore tend 
to give priority to the demands of their constituencies instead of working for the benefit of the whole 
community.
68 National Urban Land Planning/ Proclamation, Article 22
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centre. Among locals, the village is thus also known as “Kandahar” or “Torabora”, a remote region in the 
mountains of Afghanistan where Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban were hiding from the coalition forces. 
Third, newcomers, especially urban migrants from other parts of Somaliland, quickly replaced those who 
actually left the State House area. 
In other cases, the authorities reportedly even handed out cash to persuade people to vacate public land 
and government buildings. Sometimes these deals are rather obscure, involving business people who buy 
public land from the authorities and later pay its illegal occupants to leave it. Also private individuals, who 
had granted returnees a certain land for temporary use, often had to pay money in order to get their plots 
back. 
The handouts and the provision of new land have raised expectations among many illegal settlers. In Semi-
Structured Interviews and Focus Group Discussions with the research team, they often indicated that they 
expect to receive cash or an alternative plot in return for abandoning the land. Informants also suggest that 
some returnees have already found land in other parts of the city but would keep their plot on public land 
to benefit from the expected pay-offs. It is also well known that they even rent out their Buuls (traditional 
Somali hut) there, especially to refugees from the South. Nevertheless, the majority of illegal squatters are 
simply too poor and can thus not afford to move away and rent or buy another plot.
Consequently, even almost two decades after the establishment of the Somaliland state, returnees and 
urban migrants still settle on public lands such as the State House, the Stadium, Independence Garden, 
Hargeisa water storage area, Dami and Pepsi Cola (see map of Hargeisa in Figure 5). With the authorities 
unable and unwilling to evict them forcefully, they are likely to stay, lured by lucrative deals offered by 
business people, the Central government and NGOs. The problem of illegal occupation of public land will 
therefore continue to be a challenge for effective land administration in Hargeisa. 
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Figure 5: Map of major settlements of returnees, refugees and other migrants in Hargeisa69
?
6.  Urban Land-based Conflicts and Conflict Management
6.1 Land Conflicts
6.1.1 Actors and Issues
Land conflicts involve many different actors: the diaspora, which is increasingly investing in urban property, 
state institutions (the municipality authorities, the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation, and the 
Ministry of Agriculture), which issue multiple and conflicting ownership certificates, business people and 
property brokers who engage in shadow deals with the state70, officials of the Barre regime and non-Isaaq 
seeking their land back as well as security forces and clan militias, which influence conflict dynamics and 
Land-based Conflicts and Land Management
Land-based conflicts and weak land management are interrelated problems in urban Somaliland. 
Administrative shortcomings, such as Legal gaps, poor planning, institutional competition, corruption, 
low enforcement capacities and the inability to clarify landownership, are often sources of conflict. 
However, as the contested nature of land ownership and the administrative clan divisions in Burao have 
demonstrated, prevailing tensions and conflicts are also an obstacle to effective land management.
69 Source: The map was provided by SWALIM, Hargeisa 2009. Please note that the international community does not recognize 
Somaliland and thus refers to people from Southern Somalia as ‘Internally Displaced Persons’ (IDPs). As a Somaliland institution, 
however, which recognizes the independence of Somaliland, the project team refers to them as ‘refugees’.
70 Academy for Peace and Development/Institute for Development and Peace 2008: 50
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outcomes. The origins and drivers, however, are very similar: unclear landownership, public greed for land, 
weak state authority and poor land administration. 
Conflicts over public as well as private land are often a result of the civil war and displacement between 
1988 and 1991. In a report published in 2008, the research team says that after “the Barre Regime was 
ousted and the SNM had established its authority, refugees began to return to their home areas. But some 
of them found their plots and territories occupied by other people or were themselves settling down on 
other people’s land”71. Furthermore, another APD report explains that, “Plots owned by senior figures in the 
Siad Barre regime became the prize in a long contest of loud claims and counter-claims to ownership made 
both in court and on property sites”72.
 
According to local officials, however, most of these conflicts stemming from the civil war have nowadays 
been resolved and the number of land-based conflicts has generally declined since the early 2000s. 
Nowadays, against the background of the rising real estate market and weak land management, land 
disputes are related to the grabbing of public land, disputes between neighbours, the issuing of dual 
ownership certificates by the municipalities, and inheritance issues. 
The grabbing of public land is a common source of conflict between the state and illegal occupants, 
especially returnees and urban migrants. For instance, at an army garrison in Birjeex in Southwest Hargeisa, 
makeshift settlements expand beyond a previously restricted military zone close to the army barracks. The 
problem is even more complicated since many families of the soldiers themselves have settled there. 
Conflict broke out when the army sought to demolish the houses and huts to keep the settlers away from 
the garrison. The squatters fought back, raided the military barracks, burned some dysfunctional military 
equipment and almost took over the whole area. The situation was only cooled down under the mediation 
of local elders from the Arab clan. As a result, the illegal settlers are still occupying the restricted zone and 
the army has resented from further attempts to evict them. 
Also others contest the supremacy of the state and seek to grab public land illegally, for example by 
expanding their plot into state land that had originally been reserved for public facilities. At the fringes of 
towns, the municipality often has to dispute with property owners to get their share of 30 percent to which 
it is entitled. 
Inheritance of land is another source of many land conflicts in urban Somaliland. Children may dispute over 
the land of their deceased father or someone puts a parcel of inherited land for sale without the consent of 
other family members. These conflicts can be complicated due to the existence of parallel laws (state law, 
customary law and shari’a law), with different regulations regarding inheritance. Especially women are often 
disadvantaged in such disputes73. Additionally, neighbours may dispute over the boundaries or the land 
between their plots as demarcation is often very poor74. 
Land conflicts can turn violent, since small arms circulate all over the country and the state is too weak to 
stop the use of force by private individuals and to protect its citizens. In addition to that, its institutions are 
often seen as corrupt and enjoy little legitimacy. 
6.1.2 Clan Dynamics and Violent Land Conflicts in Burao and Hargeisa
Because of the weakness of the state and the dominance of clan structures in Somaliland society, land 
disputes between individuals can escalate into clan conflicts and, against the background of the wide 
71 Academy for Peace and Development/Institute for Development and Peace 2008: 16
72  Academy for Peace and Development 2006b: 12
73 See part IV on ‘Women Accessing Land’
74 Bruyas 2006: 16
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spread circulation of small arms, turn violent. This happens when, due to the limited capacity of state 
institutions, disputants see themselves forced to call upon their family and kin to support their ownership 
claims over land. They benefit from the fact that clans tend to defend their settlements from incursion by 
other clans and that clan elders can easily be manipulated. Historical animosities and grievances between 
kinship groups may further fuel tensions. Especially businessmen are said to be often involved in conflicts 
over land, since they want to buy or sell the disputed land for profit. Having the necessary resources at 
their disposal, they can influence elders to rally the clan behind their endeavour and may even finance 
militias. Accordingly, informants suggested that disputes over land are behind most violent incidents in both 
Hargeisa and Burao.
 
Again, the scope and nature of land conflicts differs between the two cities. First, as mentioned before, in 
Burao clan relations seem to be more persistent and the state weaker than in Hargeisa. Second, the city 
continues to experience a high degree of clan tension, especially between the Habar Yonis and the Habar 
Jeclo, while in Hargeisa relations between the different clans are very relaxed. Third, since in Hargeisa public 
land (Sha’ab area) is primarily located in the territory dominated by only one clan, the Habar Awal/ Saad 
Muse, conflicts over public land are more easily contained than in Burao, where state properties are located 
between the settlements of the city’s two dominant clans, the Habar Jeclo and the Habar Yonis. 
As the capital of the British Protectorate and later of the Republic of Somaliland, Hargeisa has a rather 
cosmopolitan and multi clan tradition, where people from all Somaliland regions settle. This setting allows 
for a more flexible handling of clan structures, with people from different clans intermingling and establishing 
cross clan relations. Furthermore, since relations between the different clans are generally peaceful, land 
disputes between individuals are not so likely to escalate into clan disputes. This has enabled state institutions 
to become more independent from clans and act as supra-clan institutions. They are thus more respected 
and enjoy a higher degree of freedom to act and manage land without being drawn into clan struggles. 
In Burao, however, the process of state building has effectively only started in 1997, after the conclusion 
of the conflict between the Habar Jeclo and the Habar Yonis. It is therefore less institutionalized, enjoys 
less legitimacy and is much more dependent on the local clans. When the authorities sought to prevent 
the construction of a fuel station on public property, the land grabber, an individual from the Habar Jeclo, 
mobilized support from his clan and confronted the police. The shootout resulted in the death of six people 
and could only be stopped after mediation efforts by elders. The perpetrators fled from the city and the 
municipality was able to claim back the land, but it also had to pay the blood compensation to the families 
of the dead persons.
Moreover, in the Eastern city tensions between the two major clans, the Habar Jeclo and the Habar Yonis, 
are still high. Although their relations have improved in recent years, clan animosities and grievances persist 
and peace and stability are much more fragile than in central Somaliland around Hargeisa. As a result, 
compared to the capital of the country, there is a higher chance that minor land disputes between individuals 
escalate into violent clan conflict. A case in point is a conflict that erupted in Southeast Burao over the 
memorial of Sheikh Bashir, an anti colonial hero of the Habar Jeclo clan. The close family of the deceased 
sought to grab away that land on the premise that it belonged or was at least associated with their family. 
However, they were confronted by a Habar Yonis group, who claimed that the former regime had previously 
confiscated the land illegally from a local merchant of their clan. The conflict turned violent, and six people 
were killed on both sides. After the elders and security forces had intervened, both parties retreated from 
the area and the government took over the disputed land. In the end, a fence was constructed around the 
site in order to prevent either side of reclaiming it. 
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However, the population of Burao is well aware of the destructive potential of renewed clan conflict and 
therefore seek to avoid provocation and abstain from incursion into each other’s territory. As a result, most 
land conflicts in the city happen within each clan. Nevertheless, land remains a sensitive issue between 
the two clans that can possibly lead to full-scale clan conflict, especially when land issues intermingle with 
political disputes at the national level. 
6.2 Conflict Management: Institutions and Mechanisms
6.2.1 The Performance of State Courts, Shari’a Courts and Clan Elders
Due to the general weakness of the state and its institutions, Somaliland has a de facto plural legal and 
institutional system whereby official-, customary- and shari’a law and institutions coexist and in practice are 
often combined to solve conflicts75. This allows for “forum shopping” and people can choose that institution 
and law which they expect to rule in favour for them. 
The formal judicial system is in fact an adaptation of Decree No. 3 of 1962. It had been adapted in 1993 as 
Law No. 41 and was amended in 2003 and 2006. In 2008, the amendments were finally endorsed by the 
President76. The system consists of three levels: the Supreme Court, the Regional Courts and the District 
Courts. Furthermore, appeals can be made in the Court of Appeals. Land related conflicts are referred to 
the District Court77. 
However, courts are inefficient, work slowly and are highly corrupt. According to a Human Rights Watch 
Report, some courts do not receive any funding beyond salaries, lack printed copies of the laws and many 
judges reportedly do not hold law degrees78. Furthermore, because of their negative experience with the 
judicial system under military dictatorship, Somalilanders generally do not seem to trust the courts and 
avoid getting involved with them. 
People therefore rather prefer to solve their conflicts through customary institutions or shari’a courts and 
many cases are never transferred to the official judicial system. In fact, the official courts often formalize the 
outcomes of traditional conflict resolution processes. Islamic shari’a courts, it seems, are also becoming 
more important in recent years. Several shari’a courts operate in Hargeisa and Burao and are registered 
at the Ministry of Justice. Representing the universal truth of Islam, they enjoy more legitimacy than state 
courts. Most judges have received training in shari’a law in the Middle East. Especially family and inheritance 
issues, but also other cases are brought before them. However, due to the complexity of the issue, shari’a 
courts are not so much involved in land conflict management. 
As a result, most conflicts, including those related to land, are still solved by councils of clan elders, which 
are mainly created on an ad hoc basis in order to settle disputes within and between communities. Based 
on Somali traditions and being carried out by respected community members, this institution enjoys much 
more acceptance than state courts. Interviewees thus estimated that traditional elders currently solve 80 
percent of all land conflicts. This reflects the weakness of state courts, people’s mistrust against them, 
and the strong influence of clans in providing (tenure) security79. The council of clan elders considers 
official ownership documents and hear witnesses in order to be able to make a fair judgement and, if 
possible, identify a culprit. However, in addition to that, they also seek to mediate and find solutions that are 
acceptable to both parties. Peace and Reconciliation, but not punishment and the maintenance of strict 
laws, are their primary objective. 
75 Academy for Peace and Development/Institute for Development and Peace 2008: 12; Academy for Peace and Development et 
al. 2009: 44
76 Somaliland Law.com, Somaliland Judicial System
77 Battera and Campo 2001
78  HRW 2009: 24
79 See part III, section 2
Local Capacities for Peace 201036
Despite the fact that customary methods of conflict resolution are well adapted to the Somaliland context, 
they also contain many shortcomings, especially in urban areas where traditional authorities and values are 
not as strong and uncontested as in rural areas. In previous times, clan elders applied xeer, the traditional 
Somali law. Regulating relations between nomadic clan groups regarding access to water and pasture, 
it is still the most important law in the pastoral context. However, xeer has failed to adapt to modern 
transformations in Somaliland society and is “especially weak in urban contexts, where the new social mix 
of clans and subclans generates problems where no bilateral xeer exists between the opposed groups”80.
 
Furthermore, “elders who used to make decisions based on detailed knowledge of local events now do not 
know many of the individuals that sit before them or what activities those individuals have been involved in 
across the city”81. Customary processes can also become corrupted, especially since verdicts and decisions 
are not solely based on whether claims and counter claims are correct and legitimate but on the potential 
of elders to maintain peace and stability. Thereby, strong and powerful parties often either influence the 
resolution process to obtain favourable outcomes or simply refuse to accept a non-favourable result. Since 
elders usually do not command security forces, they are not able to enforce their judgement. 
6.2.2 The Performance of ‘Hybrid’ Conflict Management Institutions
With traditional authority and laws eroding and the state unable to fill the gap, combined efforts supported 
by the moral authority of Islamic shari’a law are usually applied to solve more complicated land conflicts in 
urban areas82. Until recently, land conflicts in Hargeisa were addressed by a council which is headed by the 
district Vice Chairman and further made up of a member of the sub-district committee and three community 
elders. A very similar ‘hybrid’ institution exists in Burao, where the Chairman of the Local Council’s Land 
Subcommittee assigns some of the committee’s members to address land conflicts in cooperation with clan 
elders. The resolution process is clearly traditional, aimed at reconciling the parties involved and avoiding 
an outbreak of violence. Thereby, elders verify the conflicting claims and make sure that the verdicts are 
acceptable to the communities as well as to the disputing parties. They thus give the resolution process 
and its outcome legitimacy, a precondition for its success. 
The involvement of state authorities is also essential. First, state authorities have knowledge of land 
administration in the urban context, especially when it comes to landownership registration. For example, 
only municipality officials can check if ownership documents are forged or if property boundaries are correct. 
Second, the state can act as neutral institution between the clans and, as it commands security forces, is 
able to enforce decisions mediated by clan elders, at least in case they are accepted by the communities. 
Thus, when Habar Yonis and Habar Jeclo militias fought over a piece of land in Burao, the conflict was 
solved with the state taking over the contested plot and erecting a fence to prevent it being again grabbed 
away. 
This suggests that although the process of conflict resolution is indeed traditional, the expertise and role 
of the state is equally important, especially in urban settings where clan elders enjoy less authority and 
traditional laws cannot be applied. The Councillors are placed perfectly to chair these combined conflict 
management institution, since they represent their people in the local government and act as a link between 
the population and the municipality authorities. Usually, the resolution procedure starts at the district level, 
followed by a meeting of the Municipal Land Committee in case of serious conflict or violent dispute. 
The Municipality Land Committee, an ad hoc institution comprising the Mayor and members of the 
municipality authorities (e.g. District Police Officer, Land Department Officials) as well as traditional clan 
80 NRC et al. 160
81 NRC et al. 160
82 Academy for Peace and Development et al. 2009: 13
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elders, solves issues and disputes that are more serious, in particular conflicts over public land. According 
to Buryias83, the Municipality Committee of Hargeisa works as follows: “Under the supervision of the Mayor 
and the Governor and in the presence of a police officer and a district officer, an investigation is carried 
out after an inspection visit to the field. Witness statements are heard. A conciliation procedure starts 
with separate statements made by the claimants and proofs of the ownership are examined. Elders are 
also represented and heard during the procedure. At the end of the hearings, all the necessary security 
precautions are decided upon in order to avoid provocation and violent conflict”. 
Applying traditional methods of conflict resolution, these combined institutions were able to solve many 
land-based conflicts, especially between 1997 and the beginning of the new millennium, when urban land 
conflicts resulting from the civil war were rampant. Cases were only transferred to the district court if these 
councils proved to be unable to solve a conflict. But very often, the court then decided to transfer the case 
back to the elders and only announced the outcome of their deliberations.
Nevertheless, despite its success, in Hargeisa the combined system of conflict resolution was officially 
abolished in 2005, since the district Councillors were overloaded by the task. Furthermore, informants in 
Hargeisa suggest that since the number of land conflicts is declining in recent years, a separate system is 
not needed anymore and the official judiciary system or clan elders should handle the task. On the other 
hand, it is still acknowledged that there needs to be a special institution to handle more complicated land 
conflicts. Hence, under article 28 of the amended Law No. 17, a permanent technical committee, consisting 
of representatives from several national and local institutions, has replaced the municipality land committee. 
However, as pointed out before, its relation to the official courts remains unclear84. As the amendment was 
only introduced in 2008, it is not yet clear how far the new committee has been involved in the settling of 
land conflicts. 
7.  Conclusion and Recommendations
The root causes of many current land management challenges are to be found in the aftermaths of the civil 
war, when, due to the absence of a central administration, public and private land was occupied and taken 
over by the returning population. Landownership is still unclear and contested, as many title deeds and land 
registers were lost during the war. Today, the booming and unregulated real estate market has increased 
public greed for land. The remaining parcels of land are thus grabbed away and competition between state 
institutions, individuals and clan groups is rising. Disputes over land are behind most violent confrontations 
in Somaliland towns and cities. 
The absence of a strong state and poor land administration and regulation contribute considerably to the 
complicated situation. Despite the fact that some progress has been achieved, in particular in landownership 
registration and legalization, effective land management is still hampered by incompetence, the unclear legal 
framework, a lack of planning, institutional competition and low capacities of the administration. Moreover, 
state institutions are weak and often unable to enforce the law and implement land policies. Also the role of 
the Local Councils is rather controversial, since their internal quarrels and disputes with the administration 
add to poor land management. 
Hence, the state and the government have so far failed to address the major tasks of urban land administration 
in Somaliland: to plan the use of land; to provide social services and urban infrastructure, especially for the 
urban poor; to reclaim public land; to clarify landownership and to regulate the real estate market. 
83 Bruyas 2006: 37
84 See section 4.1
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Land-based conflicts and weak land management are interrelated problems in urban Somaliland. 
Administrative shortcomings are often a source for land conflict, which are in turn an obstacle to effective 
land management. Because of the weakness of the state and the dominance of clan structures in Somaliland 
society, land disputes between individuals can escalate into clan conflicts and, against the background of 
the wide spread circulation of small arms, turn violent. This is especially the case in Burao, where clan 
tensions remain much higher than in Hargeisa.
Most conflicts are managed through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and involve state authorities 
as well as traditional clan elders. These ‘combined’ or ‘hybrid’ institutions have been very successful in 
addressing land-based conflicts. The Local Councillors play a key role in conflict resolution processes, but 
they are often overwhelmed by their task. 
Many shortcomings in land and conflict management explained in this report can be ascribed to the evolving 
nature of the Somaliland state, its administrative structures and political institutions. Accordingly, attempts 
to administer land and manage conflicts have to be based on the limited capacities of the state and its 
relations to the population. Land and conflict management are the prerogative of the state, in particular 
that of the local administration, but its policies and activities have to be supported or at least accepted by 
the public in order to become effective. Democratic institutions and practices are necessary to facilitate 
the participation of clan elders, the business community and civil society. Consequently, effective land 
and conflict management need to include long-term and sustainable strategies that shape administrative 
systems and decision-making processes.
 
Therefore, the land-based conflict project recommends to
a) Improve the Legal Framework: The legal and institutional framework for land and conflict 
management has to be overhauled. Existing gaps, shortcomings and ambiguities in and between 
the Urban Land Management Law (Law No. 17) and the Regions and District Law (Law No. 23) have 
to be clarified, adapted and institutional duties and relations need to be regulated. 
b) Enhance Institutional Cooperation and Urban Planning: The central government should 
strengthen cooperation between all institutional stakeholders and put pressure on the agencies 
involved in the NUPB to fulfil their duties and draw town maser plans. Land use planning should be 
participatory, transparent and based on consensus between all stakeholders. The local governments, 
including the Land Subcommittee of the Local Councils, should therefore participate in this process, 
especially since they are most involved in land management at the local level. Moreover, community 
representatives from the business community, elders and civil society should be consulted in order to 
guarantee community support for the town master plan.
c) Increase Land Administration Capacities: UN-Habitat and other NGOs should continue their efforts 
to increase the land management capacities of local and national institution through education, training 
and the provision of technical assistance and know how. For instance, international institutions could 
support the land surveying education program at Hargeisa University or provide technical assistance 
to extended and improve the Land Information System. Furthermore, the central government and the 
local administration have to fight corruption. This will make land management more efficient, reduce 
the number of land-based conflicts and increase public trust in state institutions. 
d) Strengthen the Role of the Local Council: Generally, all policies and decisions relating to land should 
be taken in a participatory process and in cooperation with elders and community representatives. 
The elected Local Councils can play a key role in this process and act as links between communities 
and the state, seeking to draw support among their constituencies for land management policies and 
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III. Land Tenure Security in Somaliland
1.  Introduction
According to the constitution of the Republic of Somaliland “All citizens of Somaliland shall enjoy equal rights 
and obligations before the law, and shall not be accorded precedence on grounds of colour, clan, birth, 
language, gender, property, status, opinion etc.”85. Furthermore, Article 31 states “Every person shall have 
the right to own private property, provided that it is acquired lawfully”. Thus, in Somaliland every individual 
enjoys the right to own land, a right that is inscribed in the Constitution. 
However, given the fact that the Somaliland state is weak and its capacities very limited, land tenure still 
depends more on clans than on official laws, also in urban areas. Hence, for those affiliated to the Somaliland 
clans, landownership is generally very secure, despite the prevalence of land conflicts. This, however, 
is different for marginalized groups and outsiders who lack the protection of strong clans. This section 
analyses the status of particular social groups with regard to tenure (in-)security. On the one hand, it will 
describe the status of immigrants (refugees and immigrants from Southern Somalia and Ethiopia (Amhara 
and Oromos)), and on the other hand that of discriminated groups within Somaliland society (Gabooye). 
As indicated before, the degree of tenure insecurity as well as its nature differs between these groups, 
depending on their economic and social status as well as on their specific relation to- and integration in the 
Somaliland society. 
2.  Clan and Land Tenure Security
As stated in the introduction, land tenure in Somaliland is based on clans. This tendency has its origin in 
the lawlessness and chaos of the immediate post -war period, when there was no state and clan tensions 
prevailed. In search for security and protection, people returning from the refugee camps in Ethiopia thus 
moved to their respective clan territories. The social geography in some cities changed tremendously during 
that time, as people sold their land and houses in quarters dominated by other clans and resettled in areas 
under the control of their own clan. Despite the fact that since then peace and basic administration have 
been re-established, they generally still prefer to stay in their clan strongholds in the town, where they feel 
that their land is safe from incursions by other clans. 
First, the state is weak and thus often unable to enforce the law. Second, due to historical reasons, 
people mistrust state officials, who are seen as corrupt and selfish. Third, because the state relies on clan 
consensus, clan affiliation is essential to gain access to its institutions, to influence its policies and decision-
making processes and, of course, to secure land tenure rights. Official title deeds are important to clarify 
individual landownership, but enforcement by state and society is a matter of clan relations and politics. 
Consequently, the clan is the final resort that guarantees land tenure rights. 
Public land, however, is not protected by particular clans and can thus be grabbed away more easily. Returnees 
and urban migrants who have grabbed away large patches of land after the civil war are a case in point. 
Belonging to the dominant Somaliland clans, they have so far faced little resistance from the state. They do 
not seem to be forced to leave the public land, even if alternative land and housing are provided 86. 
85  Somaliland Constitution: Article 8.
86  See part II, section 5.4
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Despite the fact that land-based conflicts still occur and ownership of some plots remains contested, 
interviewees and participants in Focus Group Discussions thus did not mention land tenure insecurity as a 
major problem in urban Somaliland, despite the prevalence of land-based conflicts. Nowadays, it was said, 
most land-based disputes resulting from the civil war have been resolved. The reestablishment of a Land 
Information System and an effective landownership legalization process have further secured land tenure. 
Most disputes are thus more related to public land, boundary expansions and undeveloped properties at 
the fringes of towns. 
3.  Land Tenure Insecurity of Immigrants and Marginalized Groups
3.1 Refugee and Immigrants from Southern Somalia
Peoples from Southern Somalia, mainly from the Hawiye clans in Mogadishu, came to Somaliland in search 
for peace and economic opportunities. Most of them see Somaliland as a temporary safe heaven and plan 
to move back to Mogadishu once the security situation has improved. Accordingly, they usually abstain 
from buying land and rather rent plots and houses. 
Their socioeconomic background varies enormously. Some of them belong to the urban poor and live in 
desperate conditions. Without jobs, they can neither afford to pay high rents nor to purchase essential 
social services. They often live in congested camps and settlements at the fringes of Hargeisa, especially 
in Dami area. Other people from Southern Somalia, on the other hand, are rather well off. Having their own 
businesses, working for companies and NGOs or having access to remittances they are able to rent or 
even buy houses. Furthermore, as most of them are in some ways related to the local community, either 
by intermarriage or business links, they are also protected by its clan system. Their land rights are therefore 
very secure and they do not face eviction. 
This is different for those poor refugees from Southern Somalia not related to the local population and who 
lack resources to establish business links. Seeking to avoid legal or social problems, they do not occupy 
land illegally and prefer to rent rather than buy plots and houses. Protected neither by the authorities nor by 
local clans, land tenure security for the urban poor from the South is rather fragile. At any time neighbours, 
property owners or government authorities could evict them from the land. However, as long as they pay 
their rents they are left undisturbed. 
3.2 Gabooye Communities
Historically, the members of the Gabooye have formed an endogamous and marginalized community within 
Somali society and lived as clients of the dominant clans. They perform tasks and jobs considered menial by 
other “noble” (Aji) Somalis, such as leatherworking, metalworking, hairdressing, shoemaking, and pottery. 
Some communities were also reputed to be practitioners of sorcery. Gabooye may not intermarry with other 
Somalis and conventional paths to social mobility are not open to them87. 
The Gabooye were among the first clans to settle in Hargeisa. However, while they originally lived in central 
villages of the town, such as Sheik Madar and Jame’o Weyn near the police station, they were soon pushed 
away by the Aji clans and are nowadays confined to the more remote outskirts of the city, especially to 
Dami. In Burao, the Gabooye initially settled in the Eastern part of the town, but later on, as the value of 
real estates increased, they often sold their plots and went to more remote areas. As a result, they are no 
longer concentrated in a single neighbourhood but small clusters of Gabooye can be found on both sides 
of the town. 
87 Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development 1999: 67
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During the civil war, the Gabooye supported the military regime, hoping that this would help them to 
overcome their marginalized status and improve their livelihoods. They were assigned to a special unit to 
fight the SNM, which brought them into conflict with the Isaaq clan that supported the rebels. Other clan 
militias from the Gadabursi and the Harti had also fought alongside the disintegrating Barre regime, but they 
were later reconciled with the Isaaq clan; According to a popular viewpoint of SNM supporting clans, no 
peace agreement was made with the Gabooye. Consequently, they are still distrusted and hold responsible 
for sufferings and losses during the civil war. 
Being inferior to the politically and economically dominant clams in the Republic of Somaliland, the Gabooye 
remain marginalized and disadvantaged. At the clan conference in Boroma in 1993, they were given only a 
single seat in the lower and upper house of parliament. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, they lost their 
seat in the lower house as no party nominated one of them to run as a candidate88. Furthermore, they are 
denied employment in the state, where jobs are reserved for the Isaaq, Dir and Harti clans, and when land 
for resettlement is distributed to returnees, they never receive their fair share. Their children are mobbed 
and often fall out from school at a very young age, thus lacking the opportunity to improve their livelihoods 
through education. It is also more difficult for them to access lucrative business opportunities controlled by 
the Aji clans. 
In the context of the overall peace and reconciliation processes throughout Somaliland since 1991, the 
returning Gabooye were able to reclaim about 80 percent of their properties grabbed away from them in 
Hargeisa during the war89. Nevertheless, due to their marginalized status within the country’s clan society, 
their landownership rights remain insecure. Not protected by the dominant Aji clans, land owned by a 
Gabooye is an easy target for land grabbers, despite the fact that most Gabooye even have registered title 
deeds. Especially in Hargeisa, the properties of the Gabooye are increasingly grabbed away by neighbouring 
communities, leading to a proliferation of land-based conflicts. In Burao, where the real estate market is not 
as contested as in Hargeisa, they face less incursion from other clans. Thus, according to informants, there 
are currently only three or four pending land-based conflicts with other clans. 
In Focus Group Discussions in Hargeisa and Burao, their representatives explained that since the Aji clans 
control administrative institutions, state courts and the police, they are unlikely to secure a fair trial for a 
member of the Gabooye community. Traditional councils of elders also normally side with their competitors 
and thus fail to protect their land rights. Given their association with the former regime, disputes relating 
to events from before the war are even more unlikely to end positively for a Gabooye. For example, during 
the time of Siad Barre the Somali Commercial Bank auctioned two houses of a merchant because he was 
unable to pay back his credits. One was sold to an Isaaq and the other to a Gabooye. After the fall of the 
Barre regime, the merchant seized the house bought by the Gabooye and refused to give it back to its 
rightful owner. The Gabooye sought help from the state as well as from clan elders, but was unable to get 
his house back or at least some compensation90. 
Without clan protection and leverage over courts and law enforcing institutions, official and legally recognized 
ownership titles obviously seem to be rather useless. Thus, land tenure for the Gabooye remains insecure, 
a situation that is likely to continue as long as they are marginalized and discriminated in the Somaliland 
clan-dominated society. 
88 Academy for Peace and Development 2006a: 36
89 SCRD 1999: 68
90 Academy for Peace and Development et al. 2009: 50
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3.3 Oromo and Amhara Immigrants from Ethiopia
Amhara from Ethiopia come to Somaliland as political refugees, fleeing prosecution in their home country, 
while most Oromos are  economic migrants in search of jobs and a better life. Others reportedly pass 
through Somaliland on their way to Bossaso, from where they intend to migrate to Yemen and the Gulf 
states. While most of them settle in Hargeisa, some Oromo can also be found in Burao. 
The Amhara are a very cohesive community with their own schools, shops and open-air coffee places along 
the main roads in the Northern part of Hargeisa. They do not mix much with the Somaliland society and 
mainly stay among themselves. Some of them are registered as refugees in the UNHCR office in Hargeisa 
and wait to be resettled in a third country. Occasionally Amhara are discriminated, but Somalilanders 
generally accept them. 
Oromos from the Eastern part of Ethiopia informally cross the border to Somaliland91. Having knowledge of 
the Somali language and being followers of the Islam religion, they are able to mix with the host community. 
Nevertheless, they have the lowest social status and therefore take over jobs Somalilanders consider as 
impure and disreputable, such as garbage collection and donkey cart driving. Young women also work as 
cleaners in local households. However, there is also a growing number of Oromo, especially women and 
children, who live on the streets and make their living from begging. 
Despite the fact that they constitute an important labour force for the urban economy and have the same 
religion and a similar cultural background as the Somalis, they are merely integrated into its society. 
Somalilanders generally accept their presence and labour services, but in other respects seek to avoid 
contact with them. A striking example is the fact you will probably never find a Somalilander having an 
Oromo wife or husband. In Burao, Oromo interviewees even complained that they are sometimes not paid 
for their work and that their meagre earnings are stolen. 
Consequently, the Oromo cannot expect any justice, neither from the state, nor from clan institutions. 
This suggests that their land tenure rights remain insecure, although the research team has not found any 
examples supporting this thesis. Like most refugees from Southern Somalia, the Amahara and Oromo do 
not intend to stay permanently in Somaliland and thus do not have the ambition to own land. In Hargeisa, 
most Oromos reside in makeshift shacks in Daami neighbourhood, the domain of the Gabooy communities 
- the most marginalized community in Somaliland - and pay small rents equivalent to US$5 for a single room 
traditional house (Buul). 
4. Conclusion and Recommendations
The research results have revealed and demonstrated three important facts. First, it showed that land 
tenure security is closely tied to clan protection. Since the state is weak, mistrusted and based on the clan 
system, it is the lineage and not the constitution that guarantees landownership rights in Somaliland. This 
certainly reduces land tenure rights for those who are not affiliated to the dominant clans of the country.
 
Second, land tenure security is linked to power relations, social status and Somali culture. Weak, marginalized 
and discriminated groups, such as the Gabooye, are not protected by the dominant clans and are neither 
represented in the courts, nor in the law enforcing institutions. Thus, their properties are a rather easy 
target for land grabbers. Also women, who are the object of analysis in the next part, have often difficulties 
securing their ownership rights. 
91 See IRIN, 23.10.2009. According to officials, illegal immigration to Somaliland is rising. While in 2008 50 people were arriving daily, 
in 2009 the number has increased to 90.
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Third, currently land tenure insecurity does not seem to be a major problem in Somaliland, since it is 
mitigated by three tendencies: first, many outsiders, in particular wealthy individuals and families from 
Southern Somalia, are linked to the Somaliland clans through either business relations or intermarriage. 
Second, most immigrants from Ethiopia and poor refugees from the South do not want to own property 
in Somaliland as they intend to return to their countries of origins. They therefore rather rent than buy real 
estates. Third, in the context of the overall peace and reconciliation process in the 1990s, even most 
Gabooye had their land and properties returned. 
Nevertheless, the problem of land tenure insecurity should not be underestimated, since it still means a lot 
of suffering for those affected. Moreover, as landownership depends on clans, it is also a matter of clan 
relations and politics. Hence, conflicts and shifts in the power balance between clans could have a direct 
impact on land tenure security for individuals. 
Accordingly, the research team recommends:
•	 for	the	government,	political	parties	and	civil	society,	to	strengthen	the	capacities	of	the	state	and	
increase its law enforcing capabilities; 
•	 for	the	government,	to	adopt	policies	that	protect	particularly	the	rights	of	Gabooye and the Oromo 
communities; 
•	 for	 the	 government,	 to	 improve	 land	 tenure	 security	 for	Gabooye, refugees from the South and 
immigrants from Ethiopia through effective implementation and supervision;
•	 for	 the	 government,	 to	 increase	Gabooye representation within state and government agencies, 
especially in the judiciary and the security forces; 
•	 for	the	government	and	the	civil	society,	to	raise	awareness	to	the	needs	of	the	Gabooye, especially 
regarding land tenure, both on the institutional as well as the community level. 
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IV. Women Accessing Land in Somaliland
1. Introduction
This chapter seeks to explore the role of Somaliland’s women regarding land tenure, possibilities, 
constraints and obstacles they are facing when accessing land as well as their role in land-based conflicts. 
Understanding women’s needs requires looking at existing constraints at the macro-level (legislation and 
policies), institutional mechanisms and procedures for land-administration, and local dynamics such as 
cultural beliefs and customary practices92. 
First, it is necessary to give an overview of traditional Somali gender roles and changing patterns. It has to 
be noted, however, that there is no such category as The Somali Women. There are substantial regional 
differences, between the urban centre and rural peripheries, there are differences between and within the 
clans, regarding economic and social status (widows, divorcees, single parents, the elderly, the youth, 
etc.), and there are particular vulnerable groups such as outcasts, refugees and immigrants from Southern 
Somalia and Ethiopia. 
2. Female Researching: Methodology
Based on previous experiences when researching on women’s issues, the team continued to follow a 
gender-sensitive approach. Thus, the research on women’s access to land and their role in land-based 
conflicts was mainly carried out by the team’s female researcher, supported by a female consultant. 
Between July and August 2009, the team conducted 5 Semi-Structured Interviews (SSI) with previously 
identified female stakeholders of relevant government institutions and civil society:
	 •	 Ministry	of	Family	Affairs	and	Social	Development
	 •	 Somaliland	Women	Lawyers	Association	(SWLA)
	 •	 NAGAAD	(Women	Umbrella	Organization)
	 •	 HAVOYOCO	(Horn	of	Africa	Voluntary	Youth	Committee)
Following the understanding that women are likely to be targeted and harassed, and that matters of land 
tenure, particularly regarding to land-based conflicts, are sensitive issues, the team decided to keep the 
names of the interview respondents anonymous. 
3.  Somali Gender Roles: Tradition and Social Change
3.1 Women within the Kinship-System 
Even though it is unquestioned that there are of course other forms of identity-groups in Somali society such 
as age groups, friendships, religious and working affiliations, kinship continues to be the pivotal organizing 
principle, pervading various facets of social, economic and political daily life. Within the Somali kinship-
system, identity relations, obligatory rights and even personal security are collectively defined. 
Somali society is organized in patriarchal clans93 and their sub-clan-divisions, which extend all the way 
down to the family unit. Commonly, six major clan-families and their subdivisions are distinguished: Dir, 
Isaaq, Darood, Hawiye, Rahanweyn and Digil. In Somaliland, the traditional inhabiting clans are of Dir, Isaaq 
92 FAO 2002: 17
93 Following Lewis (1961), the Somali kinship-system can be broken down into clan-family, clan, sub-clan, sub-sub-clan, primary 
lineage and diya-paying group. The level of segmentation a person identifies himself/herself with depends on the prevailing context 
as alliances and divisions are constantly shifting. To avoid any confusion, we will continue to refer to any segment simply as clan.
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and Darood. Descent is traced through the male line of a common ancestor. For example, the lineage that 
started with the founding ancestor of Sheikh Isaaq will continue descending patrilineally, ending with a 
father as the head of a family unit and his children.
 
Within the kinship system Somali women are perceived of having a dual clan-identity, because 
intermarriage between different clans (exogamy) is frequent. Although patrilineal descent is clearly the 
decisive factor within the Somali kinship-system, marriage is an important instrument to establish economic 
and political cooperation between different clan segments. For women, this means that they marry into 
some other clan group than their father’s lineage, leaving the home of their relatives at the time of marriage. 
Hence, a woman’s clan-membership both to her father’s clan and to her husband’s and children’s clan is 
limited. This has two main implications for married women94:
a) Through marriage women are able to establish and strengthen cross-clan ties, being the key link 
between their father’s clan and their husband’s and children’s clan. They retain contact with their 
natal families throughout their lives, thus creating matrilineal links (xidid), which are considered as an 
important source of social and economic ties of support. Moreover, in times of crisis these matrilineal 
ties can be a crucial linkage of solidarity, reciprocal aid and peace.
b) On the other hand, during times of conflict a woman’s loyalty towards the family may be questioned 
on both sides by her male relatives. The lack of full integration into the clan system disadvantages 
women, who run the risk of falling out of the collective support-system in times of crisis and need, for 
example after the loss of the husband or other close family members. 
In general, male newborns are more appreciated and welcomed to the family than girls, because they 
will contribute to the numerical strength of the clan when it comes to socio-political relations of power. 
Equally, boys are believed to increase the economic wealth of the clan as they are expected to be the 
future providers of their father’s family. On the other hand, girls are believed to take away whatever they get 
to their husband’s family. A related issue is the preference of boys over girls in terms of opportunities 
to education. While boys are educated through schooling early, girls are trained to help their mothers in 
the household collecting firewood, looking after the sheep and goats, and carrying containers of water 
over long distances. In general, women and girls are traditionally assigned to domestic tasks that do not 
require school education, as it is widely argued. A Somali proverb says “Haween aad waxbartay hawsheed 
ku dhaaftay”, which translates into “To educate a woman is to lose her labour”. Moreover, women are 
considered less intelligent than men as the following Somali proverb suggests “Kal caano galeen kas 
magalo”, which means literally “Intelligence cannot reside in a chest that produces milk”95. 
There is also a common fear among Somali men, that the empowerment of women is a potential danger 
for male dominance. Schooling young girls could increase their confidence, so that they might start talking 
back or even develop promiscuous behavior and bring shame on their families. Since girls are about to 
leave their father’s family at the time of marriage, any investment in a girl’s education is likely considered 
as a waste of resources, especially among poor families, who cannot afford having all children equally 
educated. 
Taking a look at Somaliland’s school system, a survey of the women’s umbrella organization NAGAAD 
states that the gender gap among students and teaching staff is alarmingly wide. Boys´ enrolment in 
primary school is 65% while the enrolment of girls is 35%. There are 90% male teachers and only 10% 
female teachers. At the secondary level the gender gap even widens with 21% female students due to 
the high rate of drop-outs, which can be attributed to early marriage or financial problems. There are only 
94 Steiner 1996: 24
95 Warsame 2000: 29-34
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2 female teachers at the secondary level as most female teachers are concentrated in the primary levels. 
At the university level male students (80%) exceed the number of female students (20%) in the different 
faculties with the exception of the faculty of Islamic studies, where the majority is female96.
Traditionally, marriage is encouraged at an early age (for women between 15-18 years and for men between 
18-25) and is arranged by male relatives. As noted above, marriage-links serve the sociopolitical and 
economic interests of the wider community; hence, it is not considered just a private affair97. A woman is 
“given” to her future husband after the bride’s price (yarad) was settled between the male relatives of both 
sides. The yarad belongs generally to the bride’s father and her male relatives as a compensation for the 
loss of her labor as well as the loss of her reproductive value since her children will be part of her husband’s 
clan. However, according to Islamic law, a woman is entitled to get the meher, a compensation paid by 
the husband at any time of the marriage. Mainly, this serves as insurance in case of divorce. Polygamy is a 
common practice in Somali society and men are allowed up to four wives at a time. According to Islamic 
law, in order to do so, a man has to be able to provide for and to treat each wife the same. In practice, 
however, a man is likely to favour the new, younger bride98.
3.2 Women and Islam
Religion is a fundamental pillar of Somali society and an important source of identity that transcends the 
various clan divisions and loyalties. In the Somali context, historically, Islam has been interpreted and 
practiced according to pre-Islamic local customs, fusing Islamic belief with local traditions. Hence, Somali 
customary law (xeer) features certain elements of shari’a99.
Until the late 70ies and beginning 80ies, in Somalia Islam mainly served the social integration in opposition 
to non-Somalis, particularly against colonial invasion and the neighbouring Ethiopians. Up to this point the 
Somali shaped Islamic code of conduct did not enforce a strict obligation to the five pillars of Islam100. The 
events of civil war and the resulting absence of secular state structures, however, introduced a revival of 
religious practice, which led to the proliferation of Islamic welfare and schooling organizations. The growing 
influence of religious groups became most apparent in a change of dress code and public behavior, 
particularly in the urban context101. 
According to the Qur’an men and women are equal. Women cannot be forced into marriage without 
their consent. They have the same economic rights as men. It is written in the Qur’an that “to men is allotted 
what they earn, and to women what they earn” (Qur’an 4:32). Women are also granted political rights as 
they are allowed to vote and run for political offices. However, “Within political life one Islamic Hadeeth has 
widespread recognition. It says: A people will not prosper if they let a woman be their leader. This view still 
holds in the form of political discrimination against women in Somalia”102, as will be seen in chapter 3.4. 
3.3 Women’s Economic Role
Traditionally, the division of labour is clearly defined. Men are considered to be the leaders of the family 
and the household. They are the sole proprietors of the family’s livestock and economic wealth in general. 
In the traditional pastoral setting their tasks include the protection of the family and its property, the search for 
96 NAGAAD 2007b: 13
97 Steiner 1997: 25
98 Warsame 2000: 13-15
99 see Battera 2005, Le Sage 2005
100 Steiner 1997: 29
101 Bradbury 2008: 19-21
102  Steiner 1997: 29
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water from distant wells (dhaamin), exploring grazing opportunities for the livestock (sahan) and, therefore, 
deciding on migration movements. Also, the grazing and watering of camels fall under the responsibility 
of (unmarried) men, which can take them far away leaving women, children and the elderly behind in the 
nomadic camp103.
Pastoral women play a significant economic role as they do almost all the hard work. Equally, in urban 
settings women proved to be capable of feeding their families by doing menial jobs, which the men often 
overlook or shun of doing them. Hence, Somali women have always been perceived as a vital pillar in 
Somali society ensuring the wellbeing of the family. In the rural areas, the responsibilities of nomadic 
women range from domestic tasks such as child-rearing, cooking, cleaning, and further extend to caring 
for and watching the livestock that stays with the camp (goats, sheep and few burden camels), collecting 
firewood and fetching water. Additionally, women are responsible for building and dismantling the traditional 
nomadic hut (aqal) made of woven tree branches, as the family moves from one place to another in search 
for grass and water for the livestock. Although women traditionally do not own livestock, they are in large 
control over food items. Thus, consumption and distribution of milk and meat are undisputed responsibilities 
of women104. 
The modernization of the economy with the advent of colonialism, sparking off increasing sedentarisation 
and urbanization, unleashed profound changes within traditional economic gender roles. Most importantly, 
the modernization doctrine of Siyad Barre’s military regime had a far-reaching impact on family structures. 
The introduction of the Family Law in 1974 granted women equal economic and legal rights, especially 
in matters of inheritance and divorce. It further strongly encouraged women’s access to education and to 
various professions in the public and private sectors. Article 55 of the Worker’s Statute ensured the right of 
equal salary. Even though these progressive reforms were generally popular105, there was a strong resistance 
among Muslim clerics, who opposed these social changes and demanded the return to fundamental Islamic 
principles regarding the family. In 1975, ten Islamic leaders were executed for agitation and anti-revolutionary 
activities, which eventually triggered the radicalization of Islamic groups throughout Somalia106. 
Further impacts on traditional Somali gender roles were the exodus of men in search of employment, mostly 
to the Gulf states in the mid-70ies, and the consequences of war, starting with the Ogaden-war between 
Somalia and Ethiopia in 1977-78 and continuing with the civil wars of the 80ies and 90ies. These events left 
many women as the new heads of the family, who ultimately replaced men as the bread-winners107.
Today, women find employment mainly in the private and informal sectors. They engage in business 
enterprises, but mostly working as secretaries and doing other subordinate services such as cleaning. The 
majority of the self-employed women are involved in small-scale trade, selling food items, charcoal, Khat (a 
narcotic stimulant), household goods, clothes and gold. They also provide services in beauty salons, tea-
shops and restaurants.
The paradox of women bread-winners 
“In post-war Somaliland women are often the sole providers of family income as petty traders. Among 
pastoralist communities women have taken on increased responsibilities for family livelihoods. While men 
acknowledge this, it has not translated into increased decision-making powers for women. The roles and 
rights of women have not been recognized in the distribution of employment opportunities. Men have […] 
first priority in all jobs in government institutions and welfare services” (Bradbury 1997: 39).
103 WSP 2005: 273
104 Ibid.
105 Warsame 2000: 29
106 WSP 2005: 276; Bradbury 2008: 37
107 WSP 2005: 276
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Since the collapse of government institutions in 1991, numerous women’s groups and organizations 
were established, supporting women’s needs and basic rights. The eagerness of many international 
organizations promoting women’s issues and human rights further triggered the proliferation of women’s 
NGOs throughout Somaliland. Thus, many skilled and educated women, particularly so-called diasporas, 
found employment with international and local NGOs; they got absorbed into the civil society sector, which 
arguably meant a loss for women engaging in politics108.
However, poverty is the reality for many women. Most of them do not have access to credit institutions. 
Instead, the main source of credit facilities available to women is microfinance offered by local and 
international NGOs. Recent surveys of NAGAAD, however, suggest that the majority of women start their 
business with their own savings or with loans from relatives. An important way of saving money for women 
is through the membership in informal saving clubs known as Hagbad109.
Another crucial source of income are remittances transferred from Somalis living abroad. Interestingly, 
remittances are preferably channelled to female relatives despite the inferior social, economic and 
political position of Somali women. It is argued that, contrary to women, men have the tendency to invest 
money in lavish habits such as the consumption of Khat rather than supporting their families110.
3.4 Women in Political Decision-Making Processes
Even though women constitute the majority of Somaliland´s population, thus also being the main supporters 
of any political party, women are effectively excluded from political decision-making processes. 
Traditionally, governance and maintaining order in Somali society is highly decentralized. In Somali customary 
law (xeer), there are no permanent political institutions or offices, but ad-hoc assemblies (shir) under the 
chairmanship of lineage-elders (odayaasha, Sg. oday) in response to occurring crisis or basically, whenever 
there is a decision to be made. Issues evolve roughly from the regulation of pastoral resources (access to 
pasture and water as well as sharing resources with neighbouring clans), the reconciliation of conflicts, the 
declaration of war, and the collective payment of the diya (the blood compensation in case of homicide, 
which is commonly 100 camels for a man and only 50 for a woman). 
In these clan-meetings, which are traditionally held under a shady tree (geedka), all male members of the 
clan who are above the age of sixteen are allowed to participate and have a say. The egalitarian character 
of these assemblies led the most prominent anthropologist in Somali studies, Ioan M. Lewis, to describe 
Somali society as “A Pastoral Democracy”111 – a legacy that is echoed in many contemporary analyses of 
Somali society. However, this assumption fails to consider the position of women, who are not allowed to 
participate in these meetings. Decision-making is traditionally regarded as the domain of men while 
women do not have a say at all112. Although women are not supposed to give their opinions publicly, they 
are consulted privately on the matters of discussion113.
Even today, engaging in politics actively is a big challenge for Somali women. During the last 
parliamentary elections, held in 2005, out of a total number of 246 candidates seven women ran for elective 
108 see Bradbury 1997, 2008; NAGAAD 2007a
109 NAGAAD 2007b: 20; NAGAAD 2008: 23-25
110 Warsame 2001: 16
111 Lewis 1961
112 see Le Sage 2005, Gundel 2006, Höhne 2006
113 Warsame 2001: 8
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positions (two for UDUB, two for Kulmiye and three for UCID). Only two made it to parliament114. Considering 
that an estimated 55% of the voters are female115, women are vastly under-represented. There are three 
interrelated reasons:
a) First, because of a woman’s dual clan-identity, belonging to both her father’s clan and her husband’s 
and children’s clan, her loyalty towards the family remains unpredictable in the eyes of men. There will 
always be the question whom she will represent – her father’s clan or her husband’s clan? As politics 
always contain a certain clan dimension, the lack of a clear clan-identity disadvantages women to a 
great deal. A woman might even risks divorce, if she campaigns against a member of her husband’s 
family.
b) Second, in patriarchal Somali society, there is a general unwillingness of men to be represented by 
women.
c) And finally, both constraints ultimately result in the lack of financial backing of female candidates by 
their clans.
The poor outcome for female candidates was widely criticized among local intellectuals, women’s groups 
and local NGOs throughout Somaliland, and led to an outcry for a specific quota for women candidates, 
which is still being discussed by the time of writing this report116. 
 3.5 Women in Conflict and Peace
As noted above, Somali women are a vulnerable social group; hence, they are the ones who suffer particularly 
from violent conflict, displacement and poverty. For women, the death of close family members bears the 
risk of falling out of the collective security network117. Additionally they have to face forms of sexual violence 
such as a rape, which in the Somali context could hardly be more tragic as the victim is often forced to 
marry the perpetrator. Basically, this is practiced to ensure the full payment of the bride’s price (yarad) to 
her father’s clan, which otherwise would be lost as women have to enter marriage as virgins, and to avoid 
shame from the victim’s family118.
However, Somali women have always played an important role in times of conflict, and it is not the intention 
of this section to present women as mere victims. Traditionally, they do not actively participate in fighting, 
and together with other vulnerable groups such as children, the elderly, the sick and the wounded but also 
highly valued authorities such as religious and traditional leaders, women are considered as protected 
group, “biri ma geydo”, literally “spared from the spear”119. Nevertheless, women do play a very active role 
Key statistics of women in Contemporary Somaliland Politics
“According to a data obtained from the Civil Service Commission, the total number of Somaliland civil 
servants in 2006 was 5.419 out of which 1.324 were women. The data also shows that there were 
37 government senior posts/General Directors of which none was a female. Moreover, there were 
137 heads of departments of the different ministries, out of which only 7 were women. In the heads of 
sections, which number 270 in the different ministries, only 25 were woman. […] Out of 51 cabinets 
ministers and vice ministers, there is only one woman minister, the Minister of Family Affairs and Social 
Development” (NAGAAD 2007b: 18). 
114 Interpeace/Academy for Peace and Development 2006: 36
115 NAGAAD 2008: 28
116 see Interpeace/Academy for Peace and Development 2006; NAGAAD 2007a, 2007b, 2008
117 See chapter 3.1 and 4.2
118 Gundel 2006: 49
119 Bradbury 2008: 18
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CASE I: Amina grew up in the agro-pastoralist environment of Jidali village where everybody in the valley 
knew each other and contact with outsiders was limited. At the age of 17, her father arranged her marriage 
to the son of her mother’s brother. Amina´s father belongs to the Habar-Yonis sub-clan of Isaaq, whereas 
her mother is a member of the Dhulbahante sub-clan of Darood. After the marriage, she was expected to 
stick with her husband’s clan. Still, she could claim attachment to both clans. However, after the outbreak 
of civil war in 1988, government forces of Siyad Barre with the backing of Darood clans started fighting 
against the opposition movement SNM (Somali National Movement) supported mainly by Isaaq clans. For 
Amina this meant that the conflict was taking place between the clan of her husband and children and the 
clan of her father and brothers on the other side. While her father’s clan fled to the mountains, she had to 
seek refuge together with her husband’s clan and her children in the South of Sanaag and Sool. Recalling 
the long walk to the small village of Awr Boogeis, she remembers the hardship of hunger, fear and disease, 
which particularly affected her four children. Soon after their arrival in Awr Boogeis, her youngest son Abdi, 
who was only three years old, died. Later on, in 1991, when reconciliation talks were initiated in Sanaag 
region, Amina was one of the women who crossed the front-lines and facilitated first contact between the 
clan leaders.
during conflicts. The establishment of cross-clan ties through intermarriage and the resulting matrilineal 
links to affinal relatives (xidid) are a crucial source of social, economic and political cooperation. In times 
of conflict, these matrilineal linkages often form the basis for solidarity, reciprocal aid and most importantly 
peace. Hence, the cessation of hostilities and further agreements on reconciliation decided in traditional 
clan-meetings (shir), are often sealed with the “giving” of a bride to the opponent clan, which is another form 
of forced marriage called godobtir120. 
Furthermore, matrilineal ties (xidid) enable women to be key actors in the process of peace-building. 
Because of their multiple clan-affiliation, women are able to travel the country more freely than men crossing 
even disputed territories. They carry messages back and forth between the clans, thus establishing important 
channels of communication and setting the ground for peace initiatives121. More explicitly, women have their 
very own interest in peace since the conflicting opponents might be her relatives, so that her brothers may 
fight her children or vice versa, as case I shows122.
Although they are not allowed to participate in clan-meetings, women constitute an important pressure 
group, organizing rallies, chanting poets of peace and influencing stakeholders who are related to them. 
For example, during the national reconciliation processes in the early 90s, women were responsible for 
logistics, providing food and shelter for several hundred delegates of the clan-conferences. They also 
kept waiting outside the meeting halls, pushing the clan-leaders not to further delay important decisions 
regarding the establishment of peace123.
4. Women Accessing Land in Somaliland
“Land-ownership is free to everyone; there are principally same chances for men and women. But whenever 
there is conflict over land, women have less power and it is the men who have better access to law and to the 
courts. In the long run women have less chances”, as one of our interview respondents pointed out124.
  
120 Gundel 2006: 49
121 Interpeace and Academy for Peace and Development 2009: 66
122 Haroon 1997: 1-2
123 Interpeace/Academy for Peace and Development 2009: 46
124 Interview, HAVOYOCO, August 2009
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Women and Legal Pluralism
 “This legal scenario of legal diversity tends to shift the Rule of Law in Somaliland to Rule of Laws. In 
such a situation, women suffer most. They neither have the ability nor the means to maneuver in such 
situations. Hence, they end up being the looser.” (NAGAAD 2007b: 29
According to a statistical survey sampling 360 households125 in urban areas (Hargeisa, Burao and Boroma), 
the vast majority of women respondents own buildings (81%). When asked about their ownership of property 
(farm land, vehicles and livestock) less than half (42,4 %) responded positively126. Basically, there are direct 
and indirect ways for women to access land. Ownership is obtained either through buying or inheriting a 
plot of land, whereas control and utilization over land resources is exerted either through rent (particularly in 
the urban context) or, most commonly, through women’s subordinate social status as wives, grandmothers, 
aunts, sisters, daughters, cousins and so on. 
However, the situation is far more complex. Pre-Islamic customary laws (xeer) were informed by certain 
aspects of shari’a and, more recently, influenced by the legacy of colonialism introducing government 
institutions and positive law. Hence, a situation of legal pluralism was created where all three systems 
work in the same juridical domain. They complement each other, they work alongside and they can be 
contradicting127.
4.1 Women’s Access to Land within Positive Law
The constitution of the Republic of Somaliland states that “All citizens of Somaliland shall enjoy equal rights 
and obligations before the law, and shall not be accorded precedence on grounds of colour, clan, birth, 
language, gender, property, status, opinion etc.”128. Regarding land tenure, it is written in Article 31, The 
Right to Own Private Property: “Every person shall have the right to own private property, provided that it 
is acquired lawfully”.
However, government structures remain weak in present-day Somaliland and even though the constitution 
grants equal rights to men and women, including property-rights, the government has failed to adopt 
appropriate policies and efficient mechanisms of implementation that protect particularly women. Legal 
loopholes relating to land tenure lead to frequent ownership and inheritance disputes where women are 
usually the losers.
Women face a series of problems trying to exert their rights:
a) Few women can afford the expenditure of formal legal proceedings, including costs of transportation, 
issuing relevant documents and hiring a lawyer.
b) They have very little or no knowledge about their constitutional rights and the procedural steps to be 
taken.
c) The male-bias of government-institutions works against women’s representation; there are no female 
investigators, prosecutors or judges and very few female lawyers. 
d) Weak juridical institutions and reported malfunctioning such as corruption aggravate women’s inferior 
position.
e) Cultural constraints hinder women from addressing issues publicly. 
125 “A household was defined as a permanent or temporary structure occupied by a family comprising of male/female head, children 
and grandparents from the same pot. The household is important for gender relationship formation and transmission of gendered 
values” (NAGAAD 2008: 10).
126 NAGAAD 2008: 26
127 See Battera 2005, Le Sage 2005
128 Somaliland Constitution: Article 8
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CASE II: Somewhere in Burao, a well-situated woman, a so-called diaspora, bought a big plot of land. 
Because she had already encountered problems of frequent ownership, she made sure that she is 
dealing with the rightful owner; also she had strong witnesses and was in possession of all relevant 
documents. However, one day her neighbours started to harass her, because they wanted to build a 
road that would lead right through her land. She put up a fence and hired a watchman, but to no avail. 
So she went to the police. To her surprise, they did not respond to her problem at all, even though 
she went to the police station and to the municipality several times. Finally, she was told to turn to her 
family as disputes were usually handled within the clan. Having lived abroad for a long time, she did not 
believe them at first, but she followed their advice and told her relatives about her problem. Then her 
male cousins went to the Mayor and other relevant chair holders. It even turned out, that some high-
ranking government officials from Hargeisa had been involved, who tried to influence the process to 
the advantage of her neighbours. Eventually her cousins showed up on her land, this time with guns. 
They made it clear, that the neighbours were not fighting a single, helpless woman, and that whoever 
got a problem should come and see them first. From that day on, her land was secured and she never 
experienced any further problems.
According to the judiciary structure of Somaliland, the district courts have jurisdiction over all personal 
cases, including matters of family affairs such as divorce, inheritance and related land-disputes. The main 
women-specific disputes heard in courts are that of family-maintenance after divorce, followed by rape 
cases, other forms of physical violence against women and robbery. In its latest survey, the women’s 
umbrella organization NAGAAD states that slightly over half of the women respondents felt that their cases 
were dealt with fairly (52%), while 35% reported the contrary, and another 9% felt that they were treated 
very unfairly129. 
There are only two legal institutions in Somaliland, that provide women with free legal assistance, that is 
the Legal Clinic of Hargeisa University and the Somaliland Women Lawyers Association (SWLA), founded 
in 2008 with the support of UNDP. The latter also runs an internship program placing female law graduates 
with various juridical institutions for a period of at least six months.
Our interview respondents agreed that the only way to achieve equal justice is the government taking 
serious measures to improve judicial institutions, including a clear mandate on decision-makers, 
implementation and supervision. But as one interviewee exclaimed: “It is challenging for the government 
to come up with a strong law, it will take years and years to clean up sloppy government institutions. The 
government is everybody’s favorite place to work. Corruption is a huge issue.” 
The chronic weakness of government institutions to secure lend-tenure is clearly shown in the following 
case130: 
4.2 Women’s Access to Land within the Customary Law (xeer) 
Due to the prevailing weakness of government institutions as well as a common mistrust in its efficiency, 
an estimated 80% of legal disputes are solved through mechanisms of Somali customary law (xeer)131. 
Traditionally, access to land is governed by patriarchal ideology; hence, women are largely excluded from 
landownership, which is the collective property of the family and is handed down from father to son. 
Women exert control only through their subordinate status as wives, mothers, grandmothers, aunts, sisters, 
daughters, and so forth132. 
129 NAGAAD 2008: 27
130 The narrative is based on an interview conducted by Safiya Tani and Rita Glavitza in Hargeisa (August 2009).
131 Gundel 2006: 17
132 see Steiner 1997, Warsame 2000, Warsame 2001
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As described above, a significant number of women have become the head of the family and are entitled 
to land-ownership. Thus, within the traditional system there is no such xeer that prevents women from 
purchasing land. Still, whenever there is a problem regarding land tenure (or other disputes) that is settled 
through customary law (xeer), woman are not treated as individual legal subjects but according to their 
subordinate social status as wives, mothers, sisters, or other relationships towards her male relatives. 
Furthermore, a woman cannot address issues such as land-disputes single-handedly. Whenever a woman 
has a problem and wants to talk to the elders, they would ask for a male relative to come instead and 
represent her. As one interviewee pointed out “As a woman you cannot compete. You cannot talk in front 
of men or you bring shame on yourself”. Generally, in Somali culture leadership lies with men only; 
women are to be represented by her male relatives. Married women are represented by their husbands 
or adult sons or, in case of a widow with small children, by her husband’s male relatives. Unmarried women, 
widows or divorcees without children are to be represented by their brothers or other immediate male 
relatives.
Matters of inheritance, for example after the death of a husband, are settled within the husband’s family. If 
a woman has sons, there are usually no problems occurring for the widow regarding inheritance, but if she 
has no children or only daughters, the male relatives of her husband will usually take the land of question for 
themselves. Our interview respondents agreed, that among the three legal systems in place, the customary 
law offers the least protection for women. The only chance a woman has within the customary system 
would be convincing the female relatives of the elders in charge to influence them to her advantage.
4.3 Women’s Access to Land within Islamic Law/Shari’a
As to legal affairs, women usually turn to religious authorities (sheikhs) and the shari’a, where they 
feel their interests are met sufficiently compared to the other legal systems in place. In general, people are 
believed to be most likely satisfied with decisions based on shari’a. Contrary to customary law, which is 
generally flexible and open to change, what is written in the Qur’an cannot be changed. Another advantage 
over positive law is that shari’a jurisprudence is quicker and less expensive than formal courts133. 
The scope of Islamic law emerges from its main textual sources, the Qur’an, read alongside the Sunna, as 
well as the theoretical debates, evidence of policies and legal practices, court records, and fatwas. Within 
Islamic framework, a woman is granted equal economic and political rights and is legally treated as 
an independent individual. A Woman’s right to acquisition, utilization and alienation of property through 
purchase and inheritance is explicitly recognized in the Qur’an. The Qur’an notes that women “shall be 
legally entitled to their shares” and that “to men is allotted what they earn, and to women what they earn”; 
only if women choose to transfer their property can men regard it lawfully theirs.
According to compulsory rules of inheritance derived from Qur’anic verses, specific fractional shares of the 
deceased’s property are distributed to certain defined heirs among the relatives (children, parents, spouses 
and, in the absence of children, siblings). A woman’s share is generally half of what a man inherits. Even 
though a woman is granted her share of land, her brothers, for example, may insist that she takes money 
instead, as one interviewee suggested. Thus, it is more likely that a man inherits land. “The difference in 
treatment between men and women is usually explained by reference to the fact that it is also a feature of 
Islamic law that a wife is entitled to maintenance from her husband, in terms of shelter, clothing, food and 
medical care”134.
133 see Le Sage 2005
134 UN-HABITAT 2005: 11
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However, there are indications that women do feel frustration in their pursuit of property rights according to 
shari’a, because there are certain limitations, particularly as to matters of inheritance as the following case 
shows135:
5. Women in Land-Based Conflicts
As women constitute more than half of the population of Somaliland, it is assumed that the majority of 
victims suffering from land-based conflicts are women. Particular vulnerable groups among women are 
the poor and refugees, outcasts, widows, divorcees, and single-parents; all of them experiencing themselves 
at the edge or outside of the collective support system that is guaranteed through kinship-ties.
Another important group of women in land-based conflicts are returnees from abroad, commonly known as 
diasporas. Their financial capacities usually exceed the locals’ possibilities by far, so that they are perceived 
of “having their pockets full of dollars”, as one interviewee phrased it. Hence, a great part of land owned 
by women, particularly in the urban context, belongs to so-called diasporas. Although they appear as 
dominant actors, they also face cultural constraints and harassment, quite often from their own relatives. 
Generally, when asked about the perpetrators, our interviewees responded that family members are playing 
a central role in land-based conflicts. They are the ones who know best about whereabouts, the economic 
situation and relationship-status of women, for example if she is all alone and, thus, an easy target. However, 
on the other hand, women are not mere victims in land-based conflicts; they also stimulate conflict, 
pushing their male relatives to increase their families’ economic wealth, as the following case indicates136:
CASE IV: Somewhere in Hargeisa, a family suddenly found the road between their land and their 
neighbours blocked. Apparently, the neighbours had taken half of the road to increase their land. So 
the family quickly took the other part of the road in order to maintain access to their plot of land. The 
case was taken to the elders who decided that the road should be divided equally. At first, both parties 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations
Women face a series of challenges when it comes to land tenure in Somaliland. It has been shown that 
cultural, economic and institutional barriers are serious obstacles for women who attempt to purchase or 
inherit land. The reality of plural legal systems causes a lot of confusion for women, who often do not have 
the knowledge of the procedural steps to be taken and/or the financial means to fight for their rights, which 
are enshrined within the constitution. Additionally, the weakness of government institutions disadvantages 
women to a great deal. The government has yet failed to implement an effective legal framework that 
secures the rights of women, who find themselves exposed to the will of men, as cultural constraints 
continue to be the biggest obstacle for women in male-biased Somali society. Therefore, it is strongly 
recommended
CASE III: There was a married couple, who lived somewhere in Hargeisa. When the husband died, he 
left no children and because he had no brothers and no first or even second male cousins, more than 
half of that land went to his third cousin, who eventually decided to sell the house. The deceased’s wife 
had been married to her husband for over 30 years, taking care of him and nursing him to the very end. 
Apparently, her commitment had no weight in the judges’ verdict based on shari’a. In the end, there 
was nothing she could do about it and so she lost her house.
135 The narrative is based on an interview conducted by Safiya Tani and Rita Glavitza in Hargeisa (August 2009).
136 The narrative is based on an interview conducted by Safiya Tani and Rita Glavitza in Hargeisa (August 2009).
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•	 for	the	government,	to	adopt	policies	that	protect	particularly	women’s	rights	
•	 for	 the	 government,	 to	 improve	 land	 tenure	 security	 for	 women	 through	 effective	 and	 unbiased	
implementation and supervision;
•	 for	the	government,	to	increase	women’s	representation	within	the	judiciary;
•	 for	 the	 government	 and	 stakeholders	 of	 the	 civil	 society,	 to	 raise	 awareness	 to	women’s	 needs	
regarding land tenure, both on the institutional as well as the community level;
•	 for	the	community	leaders,	to	eliminate	traditional	rules	that	discriminate	women	in	land	tenure.
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VI. Appendixes
Figure 6: Map of Hargeisa
Source: Google Earth
Figure 7: Map of Burao
Source: Google Earth
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Figure 8: Map of Somaliland
Source: Somaliland Government Official Website
Figure 9: Somaliland Clan Chart
Please note that this clan chart is not all inclusive and only shows some of the largest and politically more 
relevant clans and sub-clans. 
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Figure 10: List of research and dialogue activities
a) Hargeisa
No Date Type Interview Partner/ Group
1 11/07/09 Semi-Structured Interview SWLA (Somaliland Women’s Lawyers 
Association)
2 3/07/09 Meeting Working Group
3 15/07/09 Semi-Structured Interview Director of Land Management Department 
Hargeisa
4 August 09 Semi-Structured Interview Havoyoco
5 August 09 Semi-Structured Interview Nagaad
6 August 09 Semi-Structured Interview Ministry of Family Affairs and Social 
Development
7 August 09 Semi-Structured Interview Interpeace (Hargeisa Office)
8 August 09 Semi-Structured Interview Director of the National Urban Planning 
Commission of the Ministry of Public Works
9 22/09/09 Focus Group Discussion Returnee Representatives
10 23/09/09 Focus Group Discussion Gabooye Community Representatives
11 29/09/09 Focus Group Discussion Oromo Community Representatives
b) Burao
No Date Type Interview Partner/ Group
1 19/10/09 Focus Group Discussion Gabooye Community Representatives
2 20/10/09 Focus Group Discussion Women Groups Representatives
3 21/10/09 Focus Group Discussion Returnee Representatives
4 22/10/09 Focus Group Discussion Locale Councillors
5 23/10/09 Focus Group Discussion Real estate Brokers
6 26/10/09 Consultation Workshop/
Presentation
Various Actors (State and NGO Officials)
7 12/12/09 Focus Group Discussion Judges and Judiciary Officials
8 13/12/09 Focus Group Discussion Returnee and Refugee Representatives
9 13/12/09 Focus Group Discussion Locale Government Representatives
10 14/12/09 Focus Group Discussion Oromo Community Representatives
11 14/12/09 Public Presentation Burao Public 
12 15/12/09 Focus Group Discussion Elders
13 D e c e m b e r 
09
Film Shows in Burao in
•Kosor
•	Ali	Hussein
•	Booramo
•	Qota
Communities
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